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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes the initial efforts of the Federal Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to implement the essential mental health and substance use
disorder services benefit required by section 1302(b)(1)(E) of the Affordable Care
Act (ACA)1 and proposes the adoption of a comprehensive and specific essential
mental health and substance use disorder benefit set. At a minimum, the benefit set
should cover medically necessary and evidence-based inpatient and outpatient
mental healthcare services, inpatient substance abuse detoxification services,
inpatient and outpatient substance abuse rehabilitation services, emergency mental
healthcare services, prescription drugs for mental health conditions, participation in
psychiatric disease management programs, and community-based mental healthcare
services.
This Article builds on three previous articles that have proposed reforms of
federal and state mental health parity laws and mandatory mental health and
substance use disorder benefit laws. The first article in this series challenged the less
comprehensive public and private health insurance benefits that historically have
been available to individuals who have illnesses traditionally classified as mental
and proposed changes to federal statutes and regulations governing Medicare,
Medicaid, self-funded non-federal governmental health plans, small group health
plans, large group health plans, and grandfathered health plans.2 The first article
proposed extending federal mental health parity law and mandatory mental health
and substance use disorder benefits to all public healthcare program beneficiaries
and private health plan members.3 The second article in the series justified and
proposed amendments to divergent state mental health parity laws and offered a
uniform mental health parity law for consideration by state legislatures.4 The third
article provided additional support for my earlier proposal to extend federal mental
health parity law and mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefits to
all public healthcare program beneficiaries and private health plan members.5 The
third article grounded such support in health-related doctrine outside the context of
mental health insurance law (including disability discrimination law, civil rights and

1
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(2010) (to be codified primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Section 1302(b)(1)(E) of the
Affordable Care Act provides: “The Secretary [of HHS] shall define the essential health benefits,
except that such benefits shall include at least the following general categories and the items and
services covered within the categories: . . . (E) Mental health and substance use disorder services,
including behavioral health treatment.”
2
See Stacey A. Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal: Reforming Federal Mental Health
Insurance Law, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2012).
3
See id.
4
See Stacey A. Tovino, Reforming State Mental Health Parity Law, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 455 (2011).
5
See Stacey A. Tovino, Further Support for Mental Health Parity Law and Mandatory Mental
Health and Substance Use Disorder Benefits, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 147 (2012).
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human rights law, health information confidentiality law, and child and adult health
and welfare law) as well as international, national, state, and professional definitions
of “health.”6 The third article also contextualized remaining mental health benefit
disparities in terms of the centuries-old mind-body problem and the stigma that
continues to be associated with mental illness.7
At the time these three articles were written, HHS has not yet attempted to
implement the essential health benefits provision in section 1302 of ACA (the “EHB
Provision”), which requires exchange-offered qualified health plans, non-exchangeoffered individual health plans, non-exchange-offered small group health plans,
Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plans, and state basic health plans
to cover at least ten general categories of health services.8 The ten required
categories of services include ambulatory patient services, emergency services,
hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance use
disorder services (including behavioral health treatment), prescription drugs,
rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, laboratory services, preventive
and wellness services and chronic disease management, and pediatric services
(including oral and vision care) (collectively, the “EHB Package”).9
During the last year, HHS has taken initial steps to implement the EHB
Provision. As discussed in more detail in Parts III.D and III.E, infra, HHS requested
guidance from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) on the criteria and methods that
should be used to determine and update the EHB Package.10 In response, the IOM
formed the Committee on Defining and Revising an Essential Health Benefits
Package for Qualified Health Plans (“Committee”).11 The Committee responded by
providing opportunities for the public to comment on the EHB Package through two
different venues,12 including through a Web-distributed questionnaire relating to the
EHB Package13 and through public workshops held on January 13-14, 2011, in
Washington, D.C., and on March 2, 2011, in Costa Mesa, California.14 The speakers
invited to these workshops included experts from federal and state government,
employers, insurers, healthcare providers, consumers, and healthcare researchers.15
On August 29, 2011, the Committee released a report entitled, Perspectives on
Essential Health Benefits: Workshop Report (“Workshop Report”), which
summarized the speaker presentations from the D.C. and Costa Mesa workshops but
did not contain the Committee’s own recommendations regarding the EHB
Package.16
On October 7, 2011, the Committee released its own consensus report entitled,
Essential Health Benefits: Balancing Coverage and Costs (“Consensus Report”).17

6

Id.
Id.
8
ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
9
See id. § 1302(b)(1)(A)-(J).
10
INST . OF M ED ., PERSPECTIVES ON E SSENTIAL HEALTH B ENEFITS: WORKSHOP R EPORT 1 (2011)
[hereinafter WORKSHOP REPORT].
11
Id. at 1-2.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 2, 161 app. B (“Web-Based Questions for Public Input on Determination of Essential
Health Benefits.”).
14
Id. at 2 box S-1.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 15.
17
INST . OF M ED., E SSENTIAL HEALTH B ENEFITS: B ALANCING C OVERAGE AND C OST (2011)
[hereinafter C ONSENSUS R EPORT].
7
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In the Consensus Report, the Committee recommended that the Secretary of HHS
(“Secretary”) define the EHB Package to reflect the scope and design of health
benefits offered by small employers.18 The Committee also identified criteria for the
content of the aggregate EHB Package and specific components of the EHB
Package,19 as well as four policy foundations that should guide the Secretary in
determining the EHB Package, including economics, ethics, population-based
health, and evidence-based practice.20 Finally, the Committee made five specific sets
of recommendations. The Committee first recommended that the Secretary establish
a specific EHB Package benchmarked to a typical small employer plan, modified as
necessary to reflect the ten ACA-required benefit categories, and guided by a
national average premium target.21 The Committee’s second through fifth
recommendations related to establishing a framework for obtaining and analyzing
data necessary for monitoring and implementing the EHB Package, promoting state
innovation, updating the EHB Package, and creating a National Benefits Advisory
Council (NBAC).22
Following the release of the Consensus Report, HHS held an additional series of
“listening sessions” with consumers, providers, employers, plans, state
representatives, and other stakeholders in different cities across the United States.23
On December 16, 2011, HHS released its Essential Health Benefits Bulletin (“EHB
Bulletin”).24 The EHB Bulletin provides information and solicits comments on a
regulatory approach that HHS plans to propose to define the EHB Package.25 In the
EHB Bulletin, HHS explains its intent not to propose one comprehensive, specific
benefit package for all health plans in the nation to follow.26 Instead, HHS intends to
leave the states broad discretion in defining the EHB Package by allowing each state
to select a benchmark plan in that state.27 The selected benchmark plan would serve
as a reference plan, reflecting both the scope of services and any limits offered by a
typical employer plan in that state.28 HHS intends to allow health plans to make
adjustments to the benchmarked benefits (including adjustments to the specific
services covered and to any quantitative limits provided) and is considering allowing
health plans to substitute services both within and across the ten ACA-required
benefit categories.29
This Article analyzes the initial steps taken by HHS to implement the EHB
Provision,30 with a focus on the essential mental health and substance use disorder

18

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3-12.
20
Id. at 4 fig.S-1.
21
Id. at 90.
22
Id. at 8-12.
23
C TR. FOR C ONSUMER INFO . & INS. OVERSIGHT , U.S. DEP ’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
E SSENTIAL HEALTH B ENEFITS BULLETIN 3 (2011) [hereinafter EHB B ULLETIN ], available at
http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/Files2/12162011/essential_health_benefits_bulletin.pdf.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 1.
26
Id. at 8-12; see also Rebecca Farley, Essential Health Benefits: What Does the New HHS
Guidance Mean for Behavioral Health, M ENTAL HEALTHCARE REF. (Dec. 22, 2011),
http://mentalhealthcarereform.org/essential-health-benefits-what-does-the-new-hhs-guidance-meanfor-behavioral-health/.
27
EHB B ULLETIN , supra note 23, at 8.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 12.
30
ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 163 (2010), codified at 42 U.S.C.A
§ 18022 (West 2012).
19
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sub-provision codified at section 1302(b)(1)(E) of ACA (the “Mental Health Benefit
Sub-Provision”).31 Thus far, HHS understandably has focused on the ten ACArequired benefit categories as a whole and not just the Mental Health Benefit SubProvision.32 In its Workshop Report, the Committee explained that “time constraints
prohibited the [C]ommittee from hearing testimony related to each of the[] [ten
ACA-required] categories in detail.”33 The scant attention received by mental health
and substance use disorder benefits from HHS likely is a result of the time
constraints faced by the Committee. Notwithstanding, the result is a tentative HHS
plan that is timid with respect to the comprehensiveness and specificity of all
benefits, including mental and substance use disorder benefits. This Article urges
HHS to consider the possibility of long-term total healthcare cost returns on initial
comprehensive mental health treatment investments. This Article also seeks to
remedy the informational and research limitations in HHS’s initial implementation
of the EHB Provision.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II examines the historically inferior public
and private health insurance benefits available to individuals with illnesses
traditionally classified as mental. Part III reviews the development, application, and
limitations of relevant federal mental health insurance laws, recommendations, and
proposals, including the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, the Paul Wellstone and
Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, the
Affordable Care Act of 2010, the Workshop Report issued on August 29, 2011, the
Consensus Report issued on October 7, 2011, and the EHB Bulletin issued on
December 16, 2011. Part IV examines the current health plan cost literature that
supports mental health parity and comprehensive mental health and substance use
disorder benefits. Part IV also justifies and proposes the adoption of a
comprehensive and specific essential mental health and substance use disorder
services benefit.
II. HISTORICALLY INFERIOR INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR INDIVIDUALS
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS34
A. INFERIOR PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAM BENEFITS
Public healthcare programs and private health insurers have long provided less
comprehensive insurance benefits to individuals with mental illness in both the
inpatient35 and outpatient36 settings.37 The Medicare program, a public healthcare

31

Id. § 1302(b)(1)(E).
See infra notes 153, 228-32 and accompanying text.
33
WORKSHOP R EPORT, supra note 10, at 71.
34
Part II of this Article is reprinted with updates and minor changes with permission from
Tovino, supra note 2, at pt. 1.
35
An inpatient may be defined as a patient who: (1) receives room, board, and professional
services in a medical institution for a twenty-four-hour period or longer; or (2) is expected by the
institution to receive room, board, and professional services in the institution for a twenty-four-hour
period or longer even though it later develops that the patient dies, is discharged, or is transferred to
another facility and does not actually stay in the institution for twenty-four hours. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 440.2(a) (2010).
36
An outpatient may be defined as a patient of an organized medical facility, or distinct part of
that facility, who is expected by the facility to receive and who does receive professional services for
less than a twenty-four-hour period regardless of the hour of admission, whether a bed is used, and
whether the patient remains in the facility past midnight. See id.
32
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program funded and administered by the U.S. government, provides health insurance
for individuals who are sixty-five years of age or older, individuals under the age of
sixty-five who have certain disabilities, and individuals with end-stage renal disease
regardless of age.38 Both Medicare Part A, which provides hospital insurance
benefits,39 and Medicare Part B, which provides physician and other supplementary
medical insurance benefits,40 provide less comprehensive insurance benefits for
beneficiaries with mental illness.
Medicare Part A restricts beneficiaries to a lifetime maximum of 190 inpatient
days in a free-standing psychiatric hospital but places no lifetime maximum on the
number of days a beneficiary may stay as an inpatient in a non-psychiatric hospital.41
The federal government justifies the 190-day limitation as a cost-control measure.42
Some Medicare beneficiaries with severe chronic mental illnesses, including chronic
schizophrenia and affective disorders, would easily exceed 190 inpatient days over
their lifetime without the limitation.43 With the limitation, affected beneficiaries are
limited to: (1) Medicare-covered outpatient mental healthcare, which may be
insufficiently intense to treat an acute illness episode and may result in suicide or
other poor outcomes; (2) Medicare-covered inpatient care provided in a nonpsychiatric setting by clinicians who may lack the education, training, and
experience necessary to treat complex psychiatric conditions; or (3) non-covered
inpatient care provided in a psychiatric setting for which the beneficiary must pay
entirely out of pocket.44 Some beneficiaries who consider unsatisfactory the options

37
See, e.g., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & M ENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN ., DEP ’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., M ENTAL HEALTH : A R EPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 418 (1999) [hereinafter SURGEON
GENERAL R EPORT] (“Private health insurance is generally more restrictive in coverage of mental
illness than in coverage for somatic illness.”). Id. (“Federal public financing mechanisms, such as
Medicare and Medicaid, also imposed limitations on coverage . . . of ‘nervous and mental
disease’ . . . .”); Colleen L. Barry, The Political Evolution of Mental Health Parity, 14 HARV . REV.
PSYCHIATRY 185, 186 (2006) [hereinafter Barry, Political Evolution] (“Ever since the inception of
third-party payment for mental health services, coverage has been substantially more limited than
insurance for general medical care.”).
38
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2006). See generally CTRS. M EDICARE & M EDICAID SERVS., DEP ’T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CMS PRODUCT NO. 11306, WHAT IS M EDICARE ? (2011).
39
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c–1395i-5 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (establishing “[Medicare] Part A—
Hospital Insurance Benefits for Aged and Disabled”).
40
See id. §§ 1395j–1395w-4 (establishing “[Medicare] Part B—Supplementary Medical
Insurance Benefits for Aged and Disabled”).
41
See 42 C.F.R. § 409.62 (2010); see also NAT ’L POLICY FORUM , M EDICARE ’S M ENTAL HEALTH
B ENEFITS 1 (2007); C ONG. B UDGET OFFICE , CBO STAFF M EMORANDUM : THE INPATIENT
PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL B ENEFIT UNDER M EDICARE 4-5 (1993) [hereinafter CBO M EMORANDUM].
42
See Judith R. Lave & Howard H. Goldman, Medicare Financing for Mental Health Care, 9
HEALTH AFF . 19, 21 (1990) (“This limit assures that Medicare will not pay for the long-term custodial
support of the mentally ill.”); NAT ’L POLICY FORUM , supra note 41, at 10 (explaining that Medicare
Part A’s 190-day lifetime maximum on mental healthcare provided in a free-standing psychiatric
hospital was intended to limit the federal government’s mental healthcare costs).
43
See, e.g., Letter from Michael J. Fitzpatrick, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness, to
Rep. Paul Tonko (Sept. 20, 2010), available at http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=
Issue_Spotlights&template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=107512
(explaining that many non-elderly Medicare beneficiaries with disabilities have already exceeded the
190-day limit or are at imminent risk of doing so).
44
CBO M EMORANDUM, supra note 41, at 13 (noting that once a Medicare beneficiary reaches the
190-day limitation, the beneficiary may turn for care to a general hospital (where the limit does not
apply) or to outpatient care, or may forgo psychiatric care entirely); id. at 10 (“[T]he alternative
provider might be less capable of providing the most appropriate care if psychiatric hospitals have
specialized in treating certain kinds of patients—for example, those who need acute care for severe or
complex conditions.”); C AL. HEALTH ADVOCATES, SUMMARY OF M EDICARE B ENEFITS AND C OST
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of outpatient mental healthcare or inpatient care in a non-psychiatric setting may
forgo mental healthcare entirely if they are unable to pay 100 percent of the costs of
inpatient care provided in a psychiatric setting.45
In addition to the Medicare Part A limitation on inpatient care provided in a
free-standing psychiatric hospital, Medicare Part B also provides less comprehensive
outpatient mental health benefits than non-mental health benefits.46 In particular,
Medicare Part B currently imposes a forty percent beneficiary co-insurance47 on
most outpatient mental health services, including individual, family, and group
psychotherapy services, instead of the twenty percent beneficiary co-insurance
traditionally applied to non-mental health outpatient services.48 Although Medicare
will phase out the disparate co-insurances by the year 2014, Medicare beneficiaries
who receive outpatient mental health services between the present and 2014 will be
required to pay more out of pocket for outpatient mental health services compared to
outpatient physical health services.49
The Medicaid Program, a public healthcare program jointly funded by the
federal and state governments and administered by the states, provides healthcare to
certain low-income individuals and families who fit into an eligibility group
recognized by federal and state law.50 Like the Medicare Program, the Medicaid
Program also has limited support for individuals who require mental healthcare in
certain inpatient psychiatric settings. For example, Medicaid does not cover inpatient
mental healthcare provided to individuals age twenty-two through sixty-four in an

SHARING FOR 2011 (2010), available at http://www.cahealthadvocates.org/basics/benefitssummary.html (explaining that Medicare beneficiaries pay out of pocket for 100% of the costs of
inpatient services provided in a psychiatric setting after 190 days).
45
CBO M EMORANDUM , supra note 41, at 13 (“[E]nrollees who consider alternative sources of
covered care to be unsatisfactory substitutes may forgo care entirely, either because they are unable to
pay for psychiatric hospital care themselves or because they choose not to do so.”).
46
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & M EDICAID SERVS., DEP ’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
M EDIGAP C OVERAGE OF OUTPATIENT M ENTAL HEALTH SERVICES THAT ARE SUBJECT TO THE
M ENTAL HEALTH PAYMENT REDUCTION 3 (2002) [hereinafter MEDIGAP C OVERAGE ].
47
Although no health insurance-related federal statute or regulation defines “co-insurance,” it
may be defined as the insured’s liability after the insurer has paid its portion of the total healthcare
costs. See id. at 2, 6 n.ix (defining co-insurance without reference to a statute or regulation and with
respect to common parlance; that is, the beneficiary’s liability after Medicare payment is made).
48
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (calculating as Medicare-incurred expenses
only 62.5% of the outpatient expenses associated with the treatment of mental, psychoneurotic, and
personality disorders). Until 2010, Medicare was thus responsible for only 50% (i.e., 62.5% x 80%
(80% is the Medicare approved amount)) of the cost of most outpatient mental health services, and the
Medicare beneficiary was responsible for the remaining 50%. In 2008, President George W. Bush
signed into law the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, section 102 of
which increased Medicare’s portion of incurred expenses for outpatient mental health services to
68.75% in 2010 and 2011 (resulting in a 45% beneficiary co-insurance in those years), 75% in 2012
(resulting in a 40% beneficiary co-insurance), 81.25% in 2013 (resulting in a 35% beneficiary coinsurance), and 100% in 2014 and thereafter (resulting in a 20% co-insurance). By 2014, Medicare
thus will pay 80% of (and Medicare beneficiaries will pay a 20% co-insurance on) all outpatient
mental health services. Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-275, § 102, 122 Stat. 2494, 2498 (“Elimination of Discriminatory Copayment Rates for Medicare
Outpatient Psychiatric Services.”).
49
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(c).
50
See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 36-37 (1981) (“An individual is entitled to
Medicaid if he fulfills the criteria established by the state in which he lives.”); Overview Medicaid
Program—General Information, CTRS. M EDICARE & M EDICAID SERVS., DEP ’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/medicaidgeninfo/01_overview.asp? (last updated Nov. 25, 2011)
[hereinafter Medicaid Program].
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institution for mental disease (IMD),51 defined as a hospital, nursing facility, or other
institution of more than sixteen beds that is primarily engaged in providing
diagnosis, treatment, or care of persons with mental disease.52 Medicaid also does
not cover mental healthcare provided in small residential facilities, including
halfway houses, adult residential foster homes, and crisis centers.53 Due to these
limitations, many Medicaid beneficiaries are limited to: (1) Medicaid-covered
outpatient mental healthcare, which may be insufficiently intense to treat an acute
illness episode and may result in suicide or other poor outcomes; (2) Medicaidcovered inpatient care provided in a facility other than an IMD or a small residential
facility by clinicians who may lack the education, training, and experience necessary
to treat complex psychiatric conditions; or (3) non-covered inpatient care provided
in an IMD or small residential facility for which the beneficiary must pay entirely
out of pocket.54 Because Medicaid eligibility generally requires evidence of low
income,55 most Medicaid beneficiaries will not be able to pay 100% of the cost of
treatment in an IMD or small residential facility.56
B. INFERIOR PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS
Private health insurers also have a long history of providing less comprehensive
insurance benefits to individuals with mental illness.57 Traditionally, many private
insurers did not cover mental illness.58 Notwithstanding the efforts of mental health
parity advocates,59 neither the Federal Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA)60

51
See 42 C.F.R. § 435.1009(a)(2) (2006) (prohibiting Medicaid coverage of healthcare services
provided to individuals under age sixty-five who are patients in an institution for mental disease).
52
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(i) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (defining institution for mental disease).
53
See, e.g., Carl A. Taube, Howard H. Goldman & David Salkever, Medicaid Coverage for
Mental Illness: Balancing Access and Costs, 9 HEALTH AFF . 5, 8 (1990).
54
See generally M EDIGAP C OVERAGE , supra note 46 passim.
55
See, e.g., Medicaid Program, supra note 50.
56
Costs of inpatient care provided in a psychiatric setting can exceed $1000 per day in a public
facility and $2000 per day in a private facility. See, e.g., Meg Kissinger, Mental Facility’s Size Cost
Taxpayers Million, M ILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (Nov. 13, 2010), http://www.jsonline.com/
watchdog/watchdogreports/107835219.html (stating that the cost of inpatient care at Milwaukee
County Mental Health Complex, a public psychiatric hospital located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, is
$1082 per day); $58,752 for 18 Days of Involuntary Commitment to Mental Hospital, B IPOLAR :
C RAZY M ERMAID ’S B LOG (Aug. 14, 2010), http://crazymer1.wordpress.com/ 2010/08/14/58752-for18-days-of-involuntary-committment-to-mental-hospital/ (stating that the cost of inpatient care at
Fairfax Hospital, a private psychiatric hospital located in Kirkland, Washington, is between $2468 and
$3900 per day).
57
See, e.g., Colleen L. Barry et al., Design of Mental Health Benefits: Still Unequal After All
These Years, 22 HEALTH AFF . 127, 127 (2003) [hereinafter Barry et al., Still Unequal] (presenting
health insurance data from a national employer survey; finding that, even after the implementation of
the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, private employer-sponsored mental health insurance coverage is
less comprehensive than non-mental health insurance coverage).
58
SURGEON GENERAL R EPORT, supra note 37, at 418 (“Some private insurers refused to cover
mental illness treatment . . . .”).
59
Mental health parity advocates support the financing of mental healthcare on the same basis as
the financing of physical healthcare. See, e.g., id. at 426 (describing the concept of mental health
parity and explaining that “[t]he fundamental motivation behind parity legislation is the desire to
cover mental illness on the same basis as somatic illness, that is, to cover mental illness fairly”). See
generally Dana L. Kaplan, Can Legislation Alone Solve America’s Mental Health Dilemma? Current
State Legislative Schemes Cannot Achieve Mental Health Parity, 8 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 325, 328
(2005) (describing the mental health parity movement).
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nor the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction
Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA)61 discussed in Parts III.A and III.B, infra, required
private insurers to offer insurance benefits for mental illness.62 Before President
Obama signed ACA into law and unless otherwise prohibited by state law, private
health insurers were permitted to sell individual policies and group health plans that
contained benefits for illnesses traditionally classified as physical, such as cancer
and pregnancy, but that did not contain benefits for illnesses traditionally classified
as mental, including major depression and bipolar disorder.63 Under ACA, mental
health and substance use disorder benefits must be part of the EHB Package offered
in the exchange-offered qualified health plan setting,64 the non-exchange individual
health plan setting, the non-exchange small group health plan setting, the Medicaid
benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plan setting, and the state basic health plan
setting.65 However, as discussed in more detail in Part III.C, infra, the EHB Package
is not required to be provided by grandfathered health plans, large group health plans
(at least until 2017, when ACA permits the exchanges to open to large employers),
self-insured group health plans, or traditional Medicaid.66 Even after the full
implementation of healthcare reform, then, millions of insureds still will not have a
federal legal right to a mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefit.67
Prior to ACA, some health plans voluntarily included insurance benefits for
mental illness; however, many of these plans imposed higher cost-sharing
requirements and greater administrative restrictions on mental health coverage,
including higher deductibles, co-payments, and co-insurance amounts for mental
healthcare, as well as lower inpatient day and outpatient visit limitations and annual
and lifetime spending caps for mental healthcare.68 Although MHPAEA requires

60
Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA), Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944 (1996) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2006 & Supp. IV
2010)).
61
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA), Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3881 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26).
62
See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring a group
health plan (or health insurance coverage offered in connection with such a plan) to provide any
mental health benefits.”); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26(b)(1).
63
See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26(b)(1). Some states do require individual
and group health plans to include mental health benefits in their health plans. See, e.g., ALA. C ODE
§ 27-54-4(a)(1) to (8) (2010) (requiring all group health plans to include insurance benefits for a range
of mental illnesses, including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive
disorder, major depressive disorder, anxiety disorders, and mood disorders); HAW . REV. STAT .
§ 431M-2 (2010) (requiring all individual and group health plans to include insurance benefits for
mental illness as well as alcohol and drug dependency).
64
A health insurance exchange is a competitive insurance marketplace where individuals and
small businesses can purchase affordable and qualified health benefit plans beginning on or after
January 1, 2014. See Provisions of the Affordable Care Act, by Year, HEALTH C ARE . GOV,
http://www.healthcare.gov/law/timeline/full.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2011). Exchange-offered health
plans must include the EHB Package, defined to include mental health and substance use disorder
benefits, by the same date. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(b)(1)(E), 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022 (West 2012); Essential Health Benefits, HEALTH C ARE . GOV,
http://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/e/essential.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2011).
65
See EHB B ULLETIN , supra note 23, at 1 (listing the health plan settings that must comply with
ACA’s essential health benefits requirement); C ONSENSUS R EPORT , supra note 17, at 6 box S-1, 18.
66
See C ONSENSUS R EPORT, supra note 17, at 18-20.
67
See infra Part III.C.
68
See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL R EPORT , supra note 37, at 426-27 (summarizing typical mental
health benefit disparities that existed in 1997: “the most common insurance restriction was an annual
limit on inpatient days . . . ”); Barry, Political Evolution, supra note 37, at 186 (“In 1982, 31% of full-
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parity between physical health benefits and mental health benefits in terms of
deductibles, co-payments, co-insurance, inpatient day limitations, and outpatient
visit limitations,69 as discussed below in Part III.B, MHPAEA initially regulated
only large group health plans, not small group health plans.70 As enacted, MHPAEA
also did not apply to individual health insurance policies sold in the private market,
the Medicare Program, Medicaid non-managed care plans, or any self-funded nonfederal governmental group plan whose sponsor has opted out of MHPAEA.71
Before ACA and unless otherwise prohibited by state law, many public healthcare
programs and private health plans thus were permitted to contain disparate mental
health benefits.72 Although ACA broadened the application of MHPA, as expanded
by MHPAEA, from just the large group health plan setting to the exchange-offered
qualified health plan setting and the Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-equivalent
plan setting,73 some non-exchange plans continue to be exempt from MHPA as
expanded by MHPAEA and ACA (collectively, “federal mental health parity law”).
The Medicare Program and traditional fee-for-service Medicaid also continue to be
exempt from federal mental health parity law, as are self-funded, non-federal
governmental plans whose sponsors have opted out of federal mental health parity
law.74 Even after the full implementation of healthcare reform, then, many public
healthcare program beneficiaries and some individuals with private health insurance
still will not have a federal legal right to equal physical health and mental health
insurance benefits.75

time employees with mental health benefits in medium and large private firms were subject to separate
inpatient day limits, and 19% had separate outpatient visit limits. By 2002, 77% had separate inpatient
day limits, and 75% had separate outpatient visit limits . . . .”); Kaplan, supra note 59, at 329
(summarizing mental health benefit disparities that existed in the context of employer-sponsored
health plans in 1988); Keith Nelson, Legislative and Judicial Solutions for Mental Health Parity: S.
543, Reasonable Accommodation, and an Individualized Remedy Under Title I of the ADA, 51 AM . U.
L. R EV. 91, 93, 99 (2001) (discussing typical private plan limitations on mental health insurance
benefits).
69
See infra Part III.B.
70
See infra Part III.B.
71
See infra Part III.B.
72
Some states do require small group health plans and individual health insurance policies to
establish parity between physical and mental health benefits in terms of deductibles, co-payments, coinsurance, inpatient day limitations, and outpatient visit limitations. See, e.g., 24 M E. R EV. STAT. tit.
24, § 2325-A(5-C)(B)(1) (2010) (requiring health insurance policies issued in Maine to provide
insurance benefits for the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness under terms and conditions that
are no less extensive than the benefits provided for treatment of physical illness); id. § 2325-A(5C)(B)(4) (prohibiting health insurance policies issued in Maine from containing separate maximums
for physical and mental illness, separate deductibles and co-insurance amounts for physical illness and
mental illness, separate out-of-pocket limits for physical illness and mental illness, or separate office
visit limits for physical illness and mental illness); MD . C ODE ANN ., INS. § 15-802(c) (West 2012)
(requiring individual and group health insurance policies issued in Maryland to provide benefits for
the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness under the same terms and conditions that apply under the
policy or contract for the diagnosis and treatment of physical illness).
73
See infra Part III.C.
74
See infra Parts III.A-C.
75
See infra Parts III.A-C.
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III. FEDERAL MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND MANDATORY MENTAL
HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER BENEFITS: LAWS,
RECOMMENDATIONS, AND PROPOSALS76
A. THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT OF 1996
In an attempt to remedy some of the historically inferior health insurance
benefits available to individuals with mental illness, the federal government took its
first step towards establishing mental health parity on September 26, 1996, when
President Bill Clinton signed the Federal Mental Health Parity Act into law.77 In
terms of application, MHPA was very limited. As originally enacted, the statute only
regulated insured and self-insured group health plans of large employers, defined as
those employers that employ an average of fifty-one or more employees.78 MHPA
thus did not apply to the group health plans of small employers.79 MHPA also did
not apply to individual health plans, the Medicare Program, Medicaid non-managed
care plans, or any self-funded, non-federal governmental plan whose sponsor opted
out of MHPA.80 Finally, MHPA contained an “increased cost” exemption for
covered group health plans or health insurance coverage offered in connection with
such plans if the application of MHPA resulted in an increase in the cost under the

76
Parts III.A-C of this Article are reprinted with updates and minor changes with permission
from Tovino, supra note 2, at pts. II.A-C. Parts III.D-E of this Article are new.
77
See MHPA, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944 (1996).
78
See id. § 712(a)(1), (2) (applying in each case to “a group health plan (or health insurance
coverage offered in connection with such a plan . . . )”).
79
See id. § 712(c)(1)(A)-(B) (exempting from MHPA application group health plans of small
employers; defining small employers as those who employed an average of at least two but not more
than fifty employees on business days during the preceding calendar year and who employs at least
two employees on the first day of the plan year).
80
See, e.g., The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, CTRS. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS.
OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (last visited April 3, 2010) [hereinafter The
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act] (“MHPAEA does not apply to small group health
plans.”); id. (“Medicare Medicaid are not issuers of health insurance. They are public health plans
through which individuals obtain health coverage. . . . Medicaid Benchmark Benefit plans [however] . . .
are subject to certain requirements of MHPAEA.”); id. (“Non-Federal governmental employers that
provide self-funded group health plan coverage to their employees (coverage that is not provided through
an insurer) may elect to exempt their plan (opt-out) from the requirements of MHPAEA . . . .”); Colleen
L. Barry et al., A Political History of Federal Mental Health and Addiction Insurance Parity, 88
MILBANK Q. 404, 407 (2010) [hereinafter Barry et al., Political History] (explaining that the MHPAEA
applies to Medicare Advantage coverage offered through a group health plan, Medicaid managed care,
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, and state and local government plans, but not Medicaid
non-managed care plans); Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir. of the Ctr. for Medicaid and CHIP Servs.
(CMCS), Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to State Health
Officials 2 (Nov. 4, 2009), available at https://www.cms.gov/SMDL/downloads/SHO110409.pdf (“The
MHPAEA requirements apply to Medicaid only insofar as a State’s Medicaid agency contracts with one
or more managed care organizations (MCOs) or Prepaid Inpatient Health Plans (PIHPs), to provide
medical/surgical benefits as well as mental health or substance use disorder benefits . . . . MHPAEA
parity requirements do not apply to the Medicaid State plan if a State does not use MCOs or PIHPs to
provide these benefits.”); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-21(a)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (permitting sponsors
of self-insured non-federal governmental health plans to opt out of particular federal requirements); 45
C.F.R. § 146.180(a)(1)(v) (2011) (permitting sponsors of self-insured non-federal governmental health
plans to opt out of federal mental health parity requirements); Memorandum from Steve Larsen, Dir. of
Oversight, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 2 (Sept. 21, 2010) (discussing the ability of self-funded,
non-federal governmental plans to opt out of federal mental health parity law and the survival of such
ability post-ACA: “[p]rovisions subject to opt-out for plan years beginning on or after 9/23/10
[include] . . . [p]arity in the application of certain limits to mental health benefits (including requirements
of the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act)”).
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plan of at least one percent.81 By November 1998, over two years following
MHPA’s enactment, only four plans across the United States had obtained
exemptions due to cost increases of one percent or more.82
In terms of its substantive provisions, MHPA was neither a mandated offer nor a
mandated benefit law; that is, nothing in MHPA required a covered large group
health plan to actually offer or provide any mental health benefits.83 As originally
enacted, MHPA also was not a comprehensive parity law because it neither
protected individuals with substance use disorders84 nor required parity between
physical and mental health benefits in terms of deductibles, co-payments, coinsurance, inpatient day limitations, or outpatient visit limitations.85
As originally enacted, what MHPA did do was regulate lifetime and annual
spending limits that covered group health plans applied to mental health benefits if
such plans already offered both physical and mental health benefits.86 More
specifically, if a covered group health plan did not impose an aggregate lifetime or
annual limit on substantially all physical health benefits, the plan was prohibited
from imposing an aggregate lifetime or annual limit on offered mental health
benefits.87 If a covered group health plan did impose an aggregate lifetime or annual
limit on substantially all physical health benefits, the plan was required to apply the
applicable limit to both physical health and mental health benefits and not
distinguish in the application of such limit between the two benefit sets; or, the plan
was prohibited from imposing any aggregate lifetime or annual limit on mental
health benefits that was less than the applicable lifetime or annual limit imposed on
physical health benefits.88 MHPA (and, as discussed in Part III.C, infra, ACA) thus
would prohibit a covered group health plan from imposing a $20,000 annual cap or a
$100,000 lifetime cap on mental healthcare if the plan had no annual or lifetime caps
for physical healthcare or if the plan had higher caps, such as a $50,000 annual cap
or a $500,000 lifetime cap, for physical healthcare.
B. THE PAUL WELLSTONE AND PETE DOMENICI MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND
ADDICTION EQUITY ACT OF 2008
Twelve years after President Clinton signed MHPA into law, President George
W. Bush expanded federal mental health parity law by signing into law the Paul
Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of
2008.89 In terms of application, MHPAEA also was very limited. As originally

81

MHPA, Pub. L. No. 104-204, § 712(c)(2), 110 Stat. 2944 (1996).
Barry et al., Political Evolution, supra note 37, at 187.
See MHPA § 712(b)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring a group health
plan (or health insurance coverage offered in connection with such a plan) to provide any mental
health benefits . . . . ”).
84
See id. § 712(e)(4) (“The term ‘mental health benefits’ means benefits with respect to mental
health services, as defined under the terms of the plan or coverage (as the case may be), but does not
include benefits with respect to treatment of substance abuse or chemical dependency.”).
85
See id. § 712(b)(2) (“Nothing in this Section shall be construed . . . as affecting the terms and
conditions (including cost sharing, limits on numbers of visits or days of coverage, and requirements
relating to medical necessity) relating to the amount, duration, or scope of mental health benefits
under the plan or coverage . . . .”).
86
See id. § 712(a)(1)-(2).
87
See id. § 712(a)(1)(A) (no aggregate lifetime limits); id. § 712(a)(2)(A) (no annual limits).
88
See id. § 712(a)(1)(B) (aggregate lifetime limits); id. § 712(a)(2)(B) (annual limits).
89
See MHPAEA, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3881 (2008) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1185a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
82
83
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enacted, MHPAEA (like MHPA) only regulated insured and self-insured group
health plans of large employers, defined as those employers that employ an average
of fifty-one or more employees.90 MHPAEA (like MHPA) thus did not apply to
small group health plans, individual health plans, the Medicare Program, Medicaid
non-managed care plans, or any self-funded, non-federal governmental plans whose
sponsor opted out of MHPAEA.91 In terms of its substantive provisions, MHPAEA
also was neither a mandated offer nor a mandated benefit law; that is, nothing in
MHPAEA required a covered group health plan to actually offer or provide any
mental health benefits.92 Like MHPA, MHPAEA also contained an “increased cost”
exemption for covered group health plans and health insurance coverage offered in
connection with such plans, but under MHPAEA the amount of the required cost
increase increased, at least for the first year.93 That is, a covered plan that could
demonstrate a cost increase of at least two percent in the first plan year and one
percent in each subsequent plan year of the actual total costs of coverage with
respect to medical and surgical benefits and mental health and substance use
disorder benefits would be eligible for an exemption from MHPAEA for such year.94
MHPAEA required determinations of exemption-qualifying cost increases to be
made and certified in writing by a qualified and licensed actuary who in good
standing belongs to the American Academy of Actuaries.95
Notwithstanding these limitations and exemptions, MHPAEA built on MHPA
by protecting individuals with substance use disorders96 and by imposing
comprehensive parity requirements on covered group health plans. In particular,
MHPAEA required financial requirements (including deductibles, co-payments, coinsurance, and other out-of-pocket expenses)97 and treatment limitations (including
inpatient day and outpatient visit limitations)98 that covered group health plans
imposed on mental health and substance use disorder benefits to be no more
restrictive than the predominant financial requirements and treatment limitations
imposed on substantially all physical health benefits.99 MHPAEA thus prohibited
covered group health plans from imposing higher deductibles, co-payments, or co-

90
Id. § 512(a)(1) (applying only to group health plans or health insurance coverage offered in
connection with such plans).
91
See supra note 80.
92
See MHPAEA § 512(a)(1) (regulating only those group health plans that offer both physical
health and mental health benefits); The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, supra note 80
(stating, “MHPAEA does not require large group health plans and their health insurance issuers to
cover MH/SUD [mental health and substance use disorder] benefits. The law’s requirements apply
only to large group health plans and their health insurance issuers that choose to include MH/SUD
benefits in their benefit packages.”).
93
See MHPAEA § 512(a)(3) (establishing new cost exemption provisions).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
See id. § 512(a)(4) (adding a new definition of “substance use disorder benefits”); id.
§ 512(a)(1) (regulating the financial requirements and treatment limitations that are applied to both
mental health and substance use disorder benefits).
97
See id. § 512(a)(1) (including within the definition of “financial requirements” deductibles, copayments, co-insurance, and out-of-pocket expenses).
98
See id. (including within the definition of “treatment limitations” limits on the frequency of
treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, and other similar limits on the scope or duration of
treatment).
99
See id. (requiring both financial requirements and treatment limitations applicable to mental
health and substance use disorder benefits to be no more restrictive than the predominant financial
requirements and treatment limitations applied to substantially all physical health benefits covered by
the plan).
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insurances, or lower inpatient day and outpatient visit maximums, on individuals
who were seeking care for conditions—such as bipolar disorder, schizophrenia,
alcohol abuse, and drug abuse—compared to individuals who were seeking care for
traditional physical conditions—such as pregnancy, cancer, and orthopedic injuries.
On February 2, 2010, the Departments of Treasury, Labor, and HHS co-released an
interim final rule implementing MHPAEA’s requirements.100 The interim final rule
clarified in favor of patients with mental health conditions several questions that
MHPA and MHPAEA had left open, including the question whether a covered group
health plan could impose separately accumulating financial requirements or
quantitative treatment limitations on mental health and substance use disorder
benefits (“No”),101 and the question whether a covered group health plan could
impose a non-quantitative treatment limitation (including a medical necessity
limitation or an experimental/investigative limitation) on mental health and
substance use disorder benefits (also “No”).102
C. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010
Before healthcare reform, mental health insurance benefits thus were regulated
by MHPA as expanded by MHPAEA as well as by more stringent state law.103 In
March 2010, President Obama further expanded mental health parity and mental
health and substance use disorder benefit law by signing ACA into law.104 Best
known for its controversial (and constitutionally challenged) individual health
insurance mandate,105 ACA has buried within it several provisions that relate to
mental health parity and mandatory mental health and substance use disorder
benefits. If upheld,106 these provisions will extend mental health parity law and
create a mandatory mental health and substance use disorder services requirement in
a way that will benefit additional (but not all) groups of individuals with public and
private health insurance.
The first ACA provision that is relevant to mental health parity law provides:
“Section 2726 of the Public Health Service Act [PHSA] shall apply to qualified
health plans in the same manner and to the same extent as such section applies to

100
Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5410-51 (Feb. 2, 2010).
101
See id. at 5449 (revising 45 C.F.R. § 46.136(c)(3)(v) to clarify that covered group health plans
may not apply cumulative financial requirements or cumulative quantitative treatment limitations for
mental health or substance use disorder benefits in a classification that accumulates separately from
any established for medical or surgical benefits in the same classification).
102
See id. (revising 45 C.F.R. § 46.136(c)(4)(i) and (ii) to clarify that a covered group health
plan may not impose a non-quantitative treatment limitation on mental health and substance use
disorder benefits unless the processes used in applying the treatment limitation are comparable to, and
are applied no more stringently than, the processes used in applying the same limitation on medical
and surgical benefits).
103
See Tovino, supra note 4, at pts. I.A-I.D (describing the patchwork of state mental health
parity law and providing examples of state laws that are more and less stringent than federal law).
104
ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
105
Id. § 1501(a) (adding to the Internal Revenue Code: “[a]n applicable individual shall for each
month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an
applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month”).
106
See, e.g., Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011),
cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.), and cert.
granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and cert. granted in
part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012).

A PROPOSAL FOR COMPREHENSIVE AND SPECIFIC ESSENTIAL
MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER BENEFITS

485

health insurance issuers and group health plans.”107 Section 2726 of the PHSA is the
parallel citation to 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26, the section within the United States Code
where the non-ERISA provisions of MHPA as amended by MHPAEA are
codified.108 The dramatic effect of this provision is to expand the application of
MHPA and MHPAEA from just large group health plans to all qualified health plans
that are offered on one of the new ACA-created state or regional health insurance
exchanges beginning on or after January 1, 2014.109 The second relevant ACA
provision makes conforming and technical changes to PHSA section 2726 to clarify
the expansion of MHPA and MHPAEA to individual health insurance coverage.110
As a result of these two provisions, many individual and small group health plans
that were previously exempt from MHPA and MHPAEA now are prohibited from
offering inferior mental health insurance benefits, including through higher
deductibles, co-payments, and co-insurance rates, as well as lower inpatient day and
outpatient visit limitations.
A third relevant ACA provision prevents group health plans and health
insurance issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage from
establishing any lifetime as well as certain annual limits on the dollar value of
essential health benefits for any participant or beneficiary.111 Although ACA
reserves the right of a group health plan or health insurance coverage to impose
annual and lifetime per beneficiary limits on specific covered benefits that are not
essential health benefits,112 mental health and substance use disorder benefits,

107

ACA § 1311(j) (entitled “Applicability of Mental Health Parity”).
42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-26 (West 2012) (entitled “Parity in Mental Health and Substance Use
Disorder Benefits”).
109
ACA § 1311(j) (“[MHPAEA] shall apply to qualified health plans in the same manner and to
the same extent as such section applies to health insurance issuers and group health plans.”). Compare
the former MHPAEA, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3881 (2008) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1185a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)) (making its
provisions applicable to “group health plans or health insurance coverage offered in connection with
such a plan”), with the newly amended 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2010) (making its provisions applicable
to a “group health plan or a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance”).
110
ACA § 1563(c)(4) (identifying the conforming and technical changes that will be made to
former 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (current 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26)); Historical and Statutory Notes for
former 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (noting that former 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 was transferred to 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-26); see also EHB B ULLETIN , supra note 23, at 12 (“The Affordable Care Act also
specifically extends MHPAEA to the individual market.”).
111
ACA § 10101 (adding new PHSA § 2711(a)). ACA prohibits lifetime dollar limits on essential
benefits in any grandfathered or non-grandfathered health plan or insurance policy issued or renewed
on or after September 23, 2010. Id. ACA restricts and phases out annual dollar limits that all
grandfathered and non-grandfathered group health plans, as well as non-grandfathered individual
health insurance plans issued after March 23, 2010, can place on essential benefits; that is, none of
these plans can impose an annual dollar limit lower than: (i) $750,000 for a plan year or policy year
starting on or after September 23, 2010, but before September 23, 2011; (ii) $1.25 million for a plan
year or policy year starting on or after September 23, 2011, but before September 23, 2012; or (iii) $2
million for a plan year or policy year starting on or after September 23, 2012, but before January 1,
2014. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815–2711T. ACA prohibits annual limits on essential benefits beginning
January 1, 2014. See ACA § 10101 (adding new PHSA § 2711(a)(2)) (“With respect to plan years
beginning prior to January 1, 2014, a group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or
individual health insurance coverage may only establish a restricted annual limit on the dollar value of
benefits for any participant or beneficiary with respect to the scope of benefits that are essential health
benefits under section 1302(b) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as determined by the
Secretary.”); 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815–2711T (2010). See generally Lifetime & Annual Limits,
HEALTH C ARE . GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/law/features/costs/ limits/index.html (last visited Mar.
3, 2012) (explaining the new lifetime and annual limit prohibitions and restrictions).
112
ACA § 10101 (adding new PHSA § 2711(b)).
108
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including behavioral health treatments, are considered essential health benefits113
and thus are excepted from the right of reservation. This third ACA provision builds
on the original MHPA, which allowed lifetime and annual limits but only so long as
such limits that applied to treatment of mental health conditions were not lower than
those that applied to treatment of physical health conditions.114 Now, ACA prohibits
all lifetime as well as most annual limits.115
Perhaps most importantly, a fourth set of ACA provisions mandates mental
health and substance use disorder benefits in certain plan settings. Under section
1201 of ACA, a health insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the
individual or small group markets shall ensure that such coverage includes the EHB
Package required by section 1302 of ACA.116 Under section 1301 of ACA, qualified
health plans that will be offered on the new ACA-created health insurance
exchanges also must provide the EHB Package required by section 1302 of ACA.117
Under section 1331 of ACA, the optional state basic health plans118 also must
provide the EHB Package required by section 1302 of ACA.119 Finally, under
section 2001 of ACA, Medicaid benchmark plans and benchmark-equivalent plans
also must provide the EHB Package required by section 1302 of ACA.120 Under the
quadruple-referenced section 1302 of ACA, the EHB Package includes “mental
health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment.”121
Read together, these four ACA provisions are significant. Federal law for the first
time is mandating mental health and substance use disorder benefits in certain plan
settings; that is, the non-exchange individual health plan, the non-exchange small
group health plan, the exchange-offered qualified health plan, the state basic health
plan, and the Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plan settings.122
Under regulations co-published by the Departments of Treasury, Labor, and
HHS on June 17, 2010, the Departments clarified, however, that the essential health

113

ACA § 1302(b)(1)(E) (including mental health and substance use disorder services, including
behavioral health treatment, within the definition of essential health benefits).
114
See supra Part III.A.
115
HEALTH C ARE . GOV, supra note 111 (“The ban on lifetime dollar limits for most covered
benefits applies to every health plan—whether you buy coverage for yourself or your family, or you
receive coverage through your employer.”).
116
ACA § 1201 (adding new PHSA § 2707(a), to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(a)).
117
Id. § 1301(a)(1)(B) (adding new 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(B)).
118
Individuals eligible for state basic health plan coverage include individuals who are not
eligible for Medicaid and whose household income falls between 133 and 200 percent of the federal
poverty level for the family involved as well as low-income legal resident immigrants. Id. § 1331(e).
119
Id. § 1331(a)(1) (requiring state basic health plans to provide “at least the essential health
benefits described in section 1302(b) to eligible individuals in lieu of offering such individuals
coverage through an Exchange”).
120
Id. § 2001(c)(3) (adding new 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(5)).
121
Id. § 1302(b)(1)(E) (“[E]ssential health benefits . . . shall include . . . [m]ental health and
substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment.”); Pamela S. Hyde, The
Affordable Care Act and Mental Health: An Update, HEALTH C ARE . GOV (Aug. 19, 2010),
http://www.healthcare.gov/blog/2010/08/mentalhealthupdate.html (“[I]n 2014, mental health and
substance use disorder services will be part of the essential benefits package, a set of health care
service categories that must be covered by certain plans, including all insurance policies that will be
offered through the Exchanges, and Medicaid.”).
122
See id.; see also EHB B ULLETIN , supra note 24, at 1 (listing the health plan settings regulated
by ACA’s EHB requirement); C ONSENSUS R EPORT, supra note 17, at 7 box S-1, 18-23 (listing the
health plan settings regulated by ACA’s EHB requirement); Essential Health Benefits,
HEALTH C ARE . GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/e/essential.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012)
(“Insurance policies must cover these [essential health] benefits in order to be certified and offered in
Exchanges, and all Medicaid state plans must cover these services by 2014.”).
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benefit requirement does not apply to grandfathered health plans.123 A grandfathered
health plan is a group health plan or health insurance issuer that was in effect on
March 23, 2010, the day President Obama signed the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) into law.124 Non-grandfathered health plans include
group health plans and health insurance issuers established after March 23, 2010, as
well as originally grandfathered health plans that subsequently lose grandfathered
status.125 Situations that will not cause a grandfathered plan to lose grandfathered
status include: (i) the cessation of coverage by the plan of one or more or all of the
individuals enrolled in the plan on March 23, 2010, so long as the plan has
continuously covered someone since March 23, 2010; (ii) the enrollment of new
family members in the plan after March 23, 2010, so long as the family members are
dependents of an individual who was enrolled in the plan on March 23, 2010; (iii)
the enrollment of newly hired employees and the enrollment of existing employees
eligible for new enrollment after March 23, 2010;126 and (iv) entering into a new
policy, certificate or contract of insurance (that is, changing insurance carriers) after
March 23, 2010.127 Activities that will cause a grandfathered plan to lose

123
Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status
as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg.
34538, 34562 (June 17, 2010) (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–1251(a), which defines
“grandfathered health plan coverage” as “coverage provided by a group health plan, or a health
insurance issuer, in which an individual was enrolled on March 23, 2010”); id. at 34559 (explaining
that section 2707 of the Public Health Service Act does not apply to grandfathered health plans); id. at
34563 (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(c)(1)) (“[T]he provisions of PHS Act sections . . .
2707 . . . do not apply to grandfathered health plans.”); E MP. BENEFITS SEC . ADMIN ., U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR , APPLICATION OF THE NEW HEALTH R EFORM PROVISIONS OF P ART A OF T ITLE XXVII OF THE
PHS ACT TO GRANDFATHERED PLANS 1 (2010) (explaining that ACA’s essential benefit package
requirement is not applicable to grandfathered plans).
124
Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status
as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at
34562 (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(a), which defines “grandfathered health plan
coverage” as “coverage provided by a group health plan, or a health insurance issuer, in which an
individual was enrolled on March 23, 2010”).
125
Id. at 34541 (defining grandfathered plans and identifying the ways in which grandfathered
plans can lose grandfathered status, turning them into non-grandfathered plans).
126
Id. at 34562-63 (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(a)(1)(i) (cessation of coverage by
one or more or all insureds), 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(a)(4) (addition of new family members), and
29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(b)(1) (addition of newly hired or newly enrolled employees)). See
generally B ERNADETTE FERNANDEZ , C ONG . R ESEARCH SERV., GRANDFATHERED HEALTH PLANS
UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE C ARE ACT (PPACA) 1 (2011), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41166_20110103.pdf (summarizing who is allowed coverage under a
grandfathered health plan; explaining, “[c]urrent enrollees in grandfathered health plans are allowed
to re-enroll in that plan, even if renewal occurs after date of enactment. Family members are allowed
to enroll in the grandfathered plan, if such enrollment is permitted under the terms of the plan in effect
on the date of enactment. For grandfathered group plans, new employees (and their families) may
enroll in such plans”).
127
Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status
as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at
34562 (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2950.715-1251(a)(1)(ii) (“[I]f an employer or employee organization
enters into a new policy, certificate, or contract of insurance after March 23, 2010 . . . then that policy,
certificate, or contract of insurance is not a grandfathered health plan with respect to the individuals in
the group health plan.”)); 29 C.F.R. § 2950.715-1251(a)(1)(ii) (stating “if an employer or employee
organization enters into a new policy, certificate, or contract of insurance after March 23, 2010 . . .
then that policy, certificate, or contract of insurance is not a grandfathered health plan with respect to
the individuals in the group health plan”); 29 C.F.R. § 2950.715-1251(a)(1)(i) (stating “Subject to the
limitation set forth in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section, a group health plan (and any health
insurance coverage offered in connection with the group health plan) does not cease to be a
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grandfathered status include: (i) the elimination of all or substantially all benefits to
diagnose or treat a particular condition; (ii) any increase in a percentage cost-sharing
requirement; (iii) certain increases in fixed-amount cost-sharing requirements,
including deductibles and out-of-pocket limits but not co-payments; (iv) certain
increases in fixed-amount co-payments; (v) certain decreases in contribution rates by
employers and employee organizations; and (vi) certain changes in annual limits.128
The Department of Treasury predicts that forty-nine to eighty percent of small
employer plans and thirty-four to sixty-four percent of large employer plans will
relinquish grandfathered status by the end of 2013.129
Understanding the distinction between grandfathered and non-grandfathered
plans is the key to understanding the application of ACA’s health insurance reforms,
including the EHB Provision. Grandfathered health plans are exempt from the vast
majority of new insurance reforms required by ACA,130 including newly added
section 2707 of the Public Health Service Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26,
which requires health insurance issuers that offer health insurance coverage in the
individual and small group markets to ensure that such coverage includes the EHB
Package.131 The result (in terms of mandated benefits) is that grandfathered health
plans are regulated only by MHPA and MHPAEA, neither of which contains a
mandated mental health or substance use disorder benefit,132 as well as state law,
which may or may not contain a mandated mental health and substance use disorder
benefit.133 Grandfathered health plans are not the only health plans that are exempt

grandfathered health plan merely because the plan (or its sponsor) enters into a new policy, certificate,
or contract of insurance after March 23, 2010 (for example, a plan enters into a new contract with a
new issuer or a new policy is issued with an existing insurer)”).
128
Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status
as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at
34564-65 (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–1251(g)(1) (listing the changes that will cause cessation
of grandfathered status)).
129
Id. at 34552.
130
See, e.g., id. at 34540 (“[C]ertain group health plans and health insurance coverage existing as
of March 23, 2010 . . . , are subject only to certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act.”);
FERNANDEZ , supra note 126, at 1 (“Grandfathered health plans are exempt from the vast majority of
new insurance reforms under PPACA.”).
131
ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat. 119, 154 (2010), amended by Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (amending section 2707(a)
of the PHS Act and stating that “[a] health insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in
the individual or small group market shall ensure that such coverage includes the essential health
benefits package required under section 1302(a) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act”);
Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status as a
Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at
34559 (explaining that section 2707 of the PHS Act does not apply to grandfathered health plans); 29
C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(c)(1) (“[T]he provisions of PHS Act section[] . . . 2707 . . . do[es] not apply
to grandfathered health plans.”)); EMP . B ENEFITS SEC . ADMIN ., supra note 123 (explaining that ACA’s
essential benefit package requirement does not apply to grandfathered plans); C ONSENSUS R EPORT,
supra note 17, at 18 (explaining that ACA’s EHB requirement does not apply to grandfathered health
plans).
132
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(b)(1) (West 2012) (“Nothing in this section shall be
construed . . . as requiring a group health plan (or health insurance coverage offered in connection
with such a plan) to provide any mental health or substance use disorder benefits . . . .”); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 300gg-26(b)(1) (West 2012) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed . . . as requiring a group
health plan or a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage to
provide any mental health or substance use disorder benefits . . . .”).
133
See, e.g., Tovino, supra note 4, at pts. I.A-I.D (discussing different state approaches to
mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefits).
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from the EHB requirement.134 The EHB requirement also does not apply in the large
group health plan setting (at least until 2017, when ACA permits the exchanges to
open to large employers), the self-insured group health plan setting, and the
traditional Medicaid setting.135,136
D. THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE’S WORKSHOP AND CONSENSUS REPORTS OF 2011
Section 1302 of ACA requires the Secretary to define the EHB Package.137
Among other requirements, ACA further specifies that the Secretary shall: (1) ensure
that the scope of the EHB Package is equal to the scope of benefits provided under a
typical employer plan;138 (2) ensure that the EHB Package reflects an appropriate
balance among the categories so that the benefits are not unduly weighted toward
any category;139 (3) not make coverage decisions, determine reimbursement rates,
establish incentive programs, or design benefits in ways that discriminate against
individuals because of their age, disability, or expected length of life;140 (4) take into
account the healthcare needs of diverse segments of the population, including
women, children, persons with disabilities, and other groups;141 and (5) periodically
review the EHB Package and provide a report to Congress and the public assessing
whether the EHB needs to be modified or updated.142
Following ACA’s enactment, HHS requested guidance from the IOM on the
criteria and methods that should be used to determine and update the EHB
Package.143 To assist the Secretary with her responsibilities under ACA, the IOM
formed the Committee.144 The Committee was not charged with identifying the
individual elements or the detailed provisions of the EHB Package; instead, the
Committee was asked to develop a framework for considering an EHB Package that
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C ONSENSUS R EPORT, supra note 17, at 18.
See id. at 18-20 (listing the health plan settings to which ACA’s EHB requirement does not
apply); Sara Rosenbaum, Joel Teitelbaum & Katherine Hayes, The Essential Health Benefits
Provisions of the Affordable Care Act: Implications for People with Disabilities, 3 C OMMONWEALTH
FUND 1, 3 (2011) (“The act exempts large-group health plans, as well as self-insured ERISA plans and
ERISA-governed multiemployer welfare arrangements not subject to state insurance law, from the
essential benefit requirements.”).
136
According to data on currently marketed health plans, thirty-four percent of individual or
family health plan enrollees do not have coverage for substance abuse services and eighteen percent of
enrollees do not have coverage for other mental health services. See OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC ’Y
FOR P LANNING AND E VALUATION , D EP ’ T H EALTH & H UMAN S ERVS., Essential Health Benefits:
Individual Market Coverage, ASPE ISSUE B RIEF (Dec. 16, 2011) [hereinafter ASPE ISSUE B RIEF ],
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2011/IndividualMarket/ib.shtml.
137
ACA § 1302(a)(1) (“In this title, the term ‘essential health benefits package’ means, with
respect to any health plan, coverage that . . . provides for the essential health benefits defined by the
Secretary . . . .”); id. § 1302(b)(1) (“[T]he Secretary shall define the essential health benefits . . . .”).
138
Id. § 1302(b)(2)(A). The Secretary also is responsible for determining the scope of benefits
provided by a typical employer plan. To inform her determination, the Secretary was required to take
into account a report by the Department of Labor on the scope of benefits offered under employersponsored insurance. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR , SELECTED M EDICAL B ENEFITS: A R EPORT FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (2011).
139
ACA § 1302(b)(4)(A).
140
Id. § 1302(b)(4)(B).
141
Id. § 1302(b)(4)(C).
142
Id. § 1302(b)(4)(G).
143
WORKSHOP R EPORT, supra note 10.
144
Id. at 2.
135
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would be “logically cohesive, address statutory requirements, and serve HHS now
and in the future.”145
The Committee began its work by providing opportunities for the public to
comment on the EHB Package through two different venues.146 First, the Committee
requested public comment on ten different Web-distributed questions relating to the
EHB Package.147 Second, the Committee invited a number of speakers to present
their views regarding the EHB Package at public workshops held on January 13-14,
2011, in Washington, D.C., and on March 2, 2011, in Costa Mesa, California.148 The
invited speakers included experts from federal and state government, employers,
insurers, healthcare providers, consumers, and healthcare researchers.149 On August
29, 2011, the Committee released the Workshop Report, which summarized the
speaker presentations from the D.C. and Costa Mesa workshops but did not contain
the Committee’s own recommendations regarding the EHB Package.150 During the
workshops, speaker discussion coalesced around several key topics including
balancing the generosity of coverage with affordability, balancing specificity versus
flexibility in terms of the EHB Package, evaluating existing state benefit mandates
for inclusion into the EHB Package, and defining a typical employer plan.151
Because many of the speaker comments—especially those relating to balancing the
generosity of coverage with affordability and the desirability of specificity versus
flexibility in terms of the EHB Package—are relevant to the analysis and proposal
set forth in Part IV of this Article, relevant speaker comments are briefly
summarized in Part IV.
On October 7, 2011, the Committee released the Consensus Report.152 In the
Consensus Report, the Committee concluded that the Secretary should begin simply
by defining the EHB Package to reflect the scope and design of packages offered by
small employers, modified to include the ten ACA-required EHB categories.153 The
Committee also identified criteria for the content of the aggregate EHB Package and
specific components of the EHB Package,154 as well as four policy foundations (or
domains) that HHS should use in determining the EHB Package, including
economics, ethics, population-based health, and evidence-based practice.155 Like the
speaker perspectives captured in the Workshop Report, perhaps the most important
and recurring concern of the Committee that was expressed in the Consensus Report
was the perceived tension between the need for comprehensive benefits and the
concerns associated with the costs of such benefits.156
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Id. at 17.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. For the list of questions, see id. at 161-62.
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Id. at 1-2.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 3.
151
Id. at 2.
152
C ONSENSUS R EPORT, supra note 17.
153
Id. at 1.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
See id. at xi (“If the package of benefits . . . is too broad, insurance might become too
expensive.”); id. at 1 (“[T]he more expansive the benefit package is, the more it will likely cost and
the less affordable it will be.”); id. (“The basic tension [i]s how comprehensive the EHB could be and
still be affordable for consumers and payers and sustainable as a program over time.”); id. at 87 (“The
central debate in constructing the EHB package has been balancing the comprehensiveness of benefits
with their costs so as to promote value.”).
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In the end, the Committee made five specific sets of recommendations.157 The
Committee’s first major set of recommendations related to the establishment of the
EHB Package.158 That is, by May 1, 2012, the Secretary should establish an EHB
Package guided by a national average premium target.159 According to the
Committee, the starting point in establishing the initial EHB Package should be the
scope of benefits and design provided under a typical small employer plan in today’s
market.160 To specify the initial EHB Package, the scope of benefits should then be
modified to reflect the ten ACA-required benefit categories as well as additional
criteria specified elsewhere in the Consensus Report for the content of both the
aggregate EHB package and specific components of the EHB Package.161
Importantly, the Committee recommended that section 1302(b)(1) of ACA, which
states that “the essential health benefits . . . shall include at least the following
general categories and the items and services covered within the categories,” not be
read to mean that every service that is within one of the ten ACA-required categories
or is covered by a typical employer plan should automatically be included within the
EHB Package.162
Once the Secretary has developed a preliminary EHB Package, the Committee
recommends that the package be further adjusted so that the expected national
average premium for a silver plan with the EHB Package is actuarially equivalent to
the average premium that would have been paid by small employers in 2014 for a
comparable population with a typical benefit design.163 The Committee finally
recommended that the initial guidance provided by the Secretary on the contents of
the EHB package should list standard benefit inclusions and exclusions at a level of
specificity at least comparable to current best practice in the private and public
insurance market.164
The Committee’s second major recommendation was that, by January 1, 2013,
the Secretary should establish a framework for obtaining and analyzing data
necessary for monitoring implementation of and updating the EHB Package.165
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For a discussion of the five recommendations, see id. at 90-149.
Id. at 90.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. For a list of the additional criteria relating to the content of the aggregate EHB package
and specific components of the EHB package, see C ONSENSUS R EPORT , supra note 17, at 5 fig.S-2.
The Committee recommended that, in the aggregate, the EHB Package be affordable, maximize the
number of people with insurance coverage, protect the most vulnerable by addressing the particular
needs of those patients and populations, encourage better care practices by promoting the right care to
the right patient in the right setting at the right time, advance stewardship of resources by focusing on
high value services and reducing use of low value services (with value being defined as outcomes
relative to costs), address the medical concerns of greatest importance to enrollees in EHB-related
plans, as identified through a public deliberative process, and protect against the greatest financial
risks due to catastrophic events or illnesses. See id. at 5. The Committee recommended that individual
services, devices, and drugs that are part of the EHB Package be safe (i.e., expected benefits should be
greater than expected harms), be medically effective and supported by a sufficient evidence base (or,
in the absence of evidence on effectiveness, a credible standard of care), demonstrate meaningful
improvement in outcomes over current effective services and treatments, be a medical service (and not
primarily a social or educational service), and be cost effective (such that the health gain for
individual and population health is sufficient to justify the additional cost to taxpayers and
consumers). Id.
162
Id. at 63.
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Id. at 90.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 117.
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According to the Committee, the framework should account for changes related to:
(1) providers (including payment rates, contracting mechanisms, financial
incentives, and scope and organization of practice); (2) patients and consumers
(including demographics, health status, disease burden, and problems with access);
and (3) health plans (including characteristics of plans such as inclusions,
exclusions, and limitations, cost-sharing practices, patterns of enrollment and
disenrollment, network configuration, medical management programs, value-based
insurance design, and types of external appeals, risk selection, solvency, impact of
ACA-mandated limits on deductibles, co-payments, and out-of-pocket spending on
the ability of plans to offer acceptable products).166
The Committee’s third major set of recommendations related to state
innovation. As background, the health insurance reform provisions within ACA
attempt to balance federal and state authority.167 While federal law regulates certain
aspects of the individual and small group markets through various pricing and
issuance requirements, states are given relatively broad authority to operate their
own exchanges and to regulate other aspects of health insurance.168 Although ACA
clearly states that the Secretary shall define the EHB Package, ACA does not
address whether the Secretary is permitted to approve more than one EHB Package
definition if the statutory requirements are otherwise satisfied.169 Because the
Committee believes that the Secretary has the authority to approve refinements of
the EHB Package definition, if she chooses to do so,170 the Committee’s third major
set of recommendations relate to the EHB Package in terms of state innovation.
Specifically, for states administering their own exchanges that wish to adopt a
variant of the Federal EHB Package, the Committee recommended that the Secretary
should use statutory authority to grant such requests, provided that: (1) the statespecific EHB Package definition is consistent with the requirements of section 1302
of the ACA and the Committee’s criteria relating to the aggregate and specific
content of the EHB package; (2) the state definition produces a package that is
actuarially equivalent to the national package established by the Secretary; and (3)
each state’s variance request is supported by a process that has included meaningful
public input.171
The Committee’s fourth major set of recommendations related to updating the
EHB Package. That is, the Secretary should, beginning in 2015 and annually
thereafter, update the EHB Package with the goal of making the EHB Package more
fully evidence-based, specific, and value-promoting.172 The Committee also
recommended that the Secretary explicitly incorporate costs into updates to the EHB
Package and obtain an actuarial estimate of the national average premium for a
silver-level plan with the existing EHB Package in the next year.173 According to the
Committee, the actuarial estimate should account for trends in medical prices,
utilization, new technologies, and population characteristics.174 Finally, any changes
to the EHB Package should not exceed the actuarially estimated cost of the current
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package in the next year.175 To ensure over time that EHB-defined packages are
affordable and offer reasonable coverage, the Committee also recommended that the
Secretary, working in collaboration with others, develop a strategy for controlling
rates of growth in healthcare spending across all sectors in line with the rate of
growth in the economy.176
The Committee’s fifth major set of recommendations related to an NBAC. That
is, the Secretary should establish an NBAC, staffed by HHS but appointed through a
nonpartisan process, such as the Office of the Comptroller General of the United
States.177 The Committee recommended that the NBAC should: (1) by January 1,
2013, advise the Secretary on a research plan and data requirements for updating the
EHB Package; (2) starting in 2015 for implementation in 2016, make
recommendations annually to the Secretary regarding any changes to the EHB
Package by applying the Committee’s recommended criteria relating to the
aggregate and individual content of the EHB Package, any changes to the premium
target, and any mechanisms that would enhance the evidence base of the EHB
Package and its potential for promoting value; and (3) advise the Secretary on
conducting and using the results of a periodic national public deliberative process to
inform its recommendations around updates to the EHB Package.178
E. THE HHS ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS BULLETIN OF 2011
Following the release of the Consensus Report, HHS held an additional series of
“listening sessions” with consumers, providers, employers, plans, state
representatives, and other stakeholders in different cities across the United States.179
During these sessions, some consumer and provider representatives expressed their
concern regarding the Committee’s emphasis in its Consensus Report on cost over
comprehensiveness of benefits, the need for the Secretary to spell out specific,
uniform benefits in regulations, and the fact that small group plans may not represent
the typical employer plan envisioned by ACA.180 On the other hand, some employer
and health insurance representatives expressed their support for a more moderate
benefit package, flexibility in the EHB Package across the country to reflect local
preferences and practices, and benchmarking the EHB Package to small employer
plans.181
On December 16, 2011, HHS released its Essential Health Benefits Bulletin.182
The EHB Bulletin provides information and solicits comments on a regulatory
approach that HHS plans to propose to define the EHB Package.183 More
specifically, the EHB Bulletin outlines HHS’s goal of pursuing an approach that
will: (1) encompass the ten ACA-required categories of benefits; (2) reflect typical
employer health benefit plans; (3) reflect balance among the ten ACA-required
categories of benefits; (4) account for diverse health needs across many populations;
(5) ensure that there are no incentives for coverage decisions, cost sharing, or
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reimbursement rates to discriminate impermissibly against individuals because of
their age, disability, or expected length of life; (6) ensure compliance with
MHPAEA; (7) provide states a role in defining the EHB Package; and (8) balance
comprehensiveness and affordability for those purchasing coverage.184
Given the Committee’s recommendations in its Consensus Report, including the
Committee’s recommendation that the Secretary’s initial guidance should list
standard benefit inclusions and exclusions at a level of specificity at least
comparable to current best practice in the private and public insurance market, the
content of the EHB Bulletin is surprising. In the EHB Bulletin, HHS explains its
intent not to propose one comprehensive, specific benefit package for all health
plans in the nation to follow.185 Instead, HHS intends to leave the states broad
discretion in defining the EHB Package by allowing each state to select a benchmark
plan in that state.186 The selected benchmark plan would serve as a reference plan,
reflecting both the scope of services and any limits offered by a typical employer
plan in that state.187 According to statements made by the Secretary at a news
conference, HHS’s goal is to ensure that state leaders can tailor health insurance
requirements to local conditions and priorities; that is, “[c]overage that works in
Florida may not work in Nebraska.”188 HHS intends not only to allow health
insurance issuers to adopt the scope of services and limits of the selected state
benchmark, but also to vary the benchmarked benefits within certain parameters.189
More specifically, HHS intends to propose that states select a single benchmark
to serve as the standard for both exchange-offered qualified health plans in the state
as well as non-exchange-offered individual and small group health plans in the
state.190 HHS believes that the following four benchmark plans, at least for the twoyear (2014-2015) transition period immediately following the compliance date for
the EHB Provision, best reflect ACA’s intent: (1) the largest plan by enrollment in
any of the three largest small group insurance products in the state’s small group
market; (2) any of the largest three state employee health benefit plans by
enrollment; (3) any of the largest three national Federal Employees Health Benefit
Program (FEHBP) plan options by enrollment; or (4) the largest insured commercial
non-Medicaid HMO operating in the state.191 HHS intends to assess the benchmark
process for year 2016 and beyond based on evaluation and feedback.192
If a state does not exercise the option to select a benchmark health plan, HHS
intends to propose that the default benchmark plan for the state will be the largest
plan by enrollment in the largest product in the state’s small group market.193 In light
of ACA’s requirement that states defray the costs of state-mandated benefits in
excess of the EHB Package for individuals enrolled in any qualified health plan
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either in the individual market or in the small group market,194 if a state chooses in
transitional years 2014 and 2015 a benchmark such as the FEHBP plan that may not
include some or all of the state’s mandated benefits, the state would be required to
cover the costs of those mandates outside the state EHB Package.195 On the other
hand, if a state chooses a benchmark subject to state mandates, such as a small group
market plan, that benchmark would include those mandates in the state EHB
Package.196 HHS intends to evaluate the benchmark approach for calendar year 2016
and develop an approach that may exclude some state benefit mandates from
inclusion in the state EHB Package.197
HHS recognizes that not every state-selected benchmark plan will cover all ten
categories of ACA-required services.198 For example, some selected benchmark
plans may not include habilitative services, pediatric oral and vision services, or
mental health and substance use disorder services (especially in light of MHPA and
MHPAEA, neither of which contains a mandatory mental health or substance use
disorder benefit).199 HHS intends to propose that if a selected benchmark is missing
an ACA-required benefit category, the benefit category must nevertheless be
covered by health plans required to offer the EHB Package.200 Stated another way, a
state may need to supplement the benchmark plan to cover all ten of the ACArequired benefit categories.201 HHS intends to propose that if a benchmark plan is
missing one or more categories of required benefits, the state must supplement the
missing categories using the benefits from any other benchmark option.202 In a state
with a default benchmark with missing categories, the benchmark plan would be
supplemented using the largest plan in the benchmark type (e.g., small group plans
or state employee plans of FEHBP) by enrollment offering the benefit.203 If none of
the benchmark options in that benchmark type offer the benefit, the benefit will be
supplemented using the FEHBP plan with the largest enrollment.204
HHS also intends to propose that mental health parity (i.e., MHPA as expanded
by MHPAEA) applies in the context of health plans required to provide the EHB
Package, consistent with ACA’s statutory extension of federal mental health parity
law to qualified health plans discussed in Part III.C, supra.205
HHS further intends to propose that health plan benefits be “substantially equal”
to the benefits of the benchmark plan selected by the state and modified as necessary
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ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(d)(3)(B)(ii), 124 Stat. 119, 173 (2010), amended by Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
195
EHB B ULLETIN , supra note 23, at 9.
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Id. at 9-10.
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Id. For example, in a state where the default benchmark is in place but that default plan does
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using the mental health and substance use disorder benefits offered in the largest small group
benchmark plan option with coverage for mental health and substance use disorder benefits. Id. If
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to reflect the ten ACA-required service categories.206 More specifically, HHS intends
to propose that insurers have some flexibility to adjust benefits, including both the
specific services covered and any quantitative limits, provided that they continue to
cover all ten of the ACA-required benefit categories.207 According to HHS,
permitting some flexibility will: (1) provide greater choice to consumers; (2)
promote plan innovation through coverage and design options; and (3) ensure that
plans providing the EHB Package offer a certain minimum level of benefits.208 HHS
also intends to consider permitting benefit substitutions within and across each of the
ten ACA-required benefit categories.209
Again, HHS’s purpose in issuing the EHB Bulletin is to provide information
regarding its current intentions with respect to regulations it plans to propose in the
future.210 The EHB Bulletin is not, then, a formal set of proposed regulations
designed to satisfy the Federal Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment
rule-making process. Like proposed rules, however, HHS is welcoming public input
regarding the EHB Bulletin and received comments through January 31, 2012.211 As
of this writing, HHS has yet to issue proposed or final regulations implementing the
EHB Provision.
Following January 1, 2014, the compliance deadline for the EHB Provision,
HHS estimates that 4.8 million Americans who purchase health insurance in the
individual market will gain some substance abuse coverage at parity with medical
and surgical benefits and that 2.3 million Americans who purchase health insurance
in the same market will gain some mental health coverage at parity with medical and
surgical benefits.212 However, the extent to which specific mental health and
substance use disorder benefits ultimately are required to be provided to a specific
insured depends on whether HHS adopts its intended approach described in the EHB
Bulletin in final regulations and, if so, the benchmark plan that is actually selected
by (or defaulted to in) each state,213 the extent to which insurers are permitted to
adjust the benchmark benefits, and the extent to which HHS allows service
substitutions within and across the ten ACA-required benefit categories.214 If a state
selects (or is defaulted to) a benchmark plan with modest mental health and
substance use disorder benefits, many individuals with mental illness, including
alcohol and drug addiction, may not have a federal legal right to insurance benefits
that will cover all of the inpatient and outpatient services that are recommended for
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their conditions.215 On the other hand, if a state selects (or is defaulted to) a
benchmark plan with comprehensive mental health and substance use disorder
benefits, a greater number of individuals with mental illness in that state will have a
federal legal right to insurance coverage of medically necessary evidence-based
mental health treatments, unless HHS allows health plans in the state to substantially
adjust away from the benchmarked mental health benefits or substitute benefits in
one of the other nine ACA-required categories for the benchmarked mental health
benefits.
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
This Part IV analyzes the initial steps taken by HHS to implement the EHB
Provision,216 with a focus on the potentially negative clinical implications for
individuals with mental health and substance use disorders and the potentially
negative cost implications for health plans. Thus far, HHS understandably has
focused on the EHB Package as a whole with scant attention devoted to mental
health and substance use disorder benefits. On page 5 of the EHB Bulletin, HHS
briefly notes that not all plans and health insurance products cover mental health and
substance use disorder services.217 And, on page 12 of the EHB Bulletin, HHS
briefly notes that mental health and substance use disorder services are part of the
EHB Package and that ACA extends federal mental health parity law to the
individual health plan setting and the exchange-offered qualified health plan
setting.218 Other than these two points, HHS has not focused on the particular issues
surrounding mental health and substance use disorder benefits in publicly available
documentation relating to its initial implementation of the EHB Package.
HHS’s scant attention to mental health and substance use disorder benefits
likely is due to the scant attention received by such benefits in the Committee’s
Workshop Report and Consensus Report. In the Workshop Report, the Committee
explained that “time constraints prohibited the [C]ommittee from hearing testimony
related to each of the[] [ten ACA-required] categories in detail.”219 Chapter 7 of the
Workshop Report does highlight some testimony specifically relating to mental
health and substance use disorder benefits, however.220 Dr. Kenneth Wells of the
David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, Dr. Kavita Patel of the Semel Institute
for Neuroscience and Human Behavior at UCLA, and Mr. Paul Samuels of the Legal
Action Center and the Coalition for Whole Health provided important testimony
regarding the need for access to a range of evidence-based mental health and
substance use disorder treatments, the fact that mental health treatments must
recognize the chronic (not just acute) dimensions of mental illness, and the need for
collaboration and integration of services across the mental health, substance use
disorder, and physical health sectors.221 Individually, Dr. Wells also briefly
addressed the association between mental illness and physical illness (including the
fact that individuals with mental illness have a higher prevalence of physical illness),
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the role of mental illness in premature mortality and morbidity, and the cost
effectiveness of mental health treatments when viewed in light of societal costs
associated with mental illness.222 Dr. Patel also briefly addressed the importance of
covering community-based mental healthcare, including the services provided by lay
community workers and social caseworkers, citing the efficacy of community-based
mental healthcare as reported in the National Institute of Mental Health’s
Community Partners in Care study, which focused on the quality of mental
healthcare provided to individuals with depression in Los Angeles223 as well as the
Mental Health Infrastructure and Training Project, which focused on the mental
healthcare needs of individuals with depression and post-traumatic stress disorder in
post-Katrina New Orleans.224 Finally, Mr. Samuels briefly addressed the importance
of treating mental illness in light of co-morbidity problems.225 Mr. Samuels
explained that twenty-five percent of hospital admissions are directly related to
untreated mental illness and substance use disorders, and the failure of insurers to
adequately cover mental illness “cost[s] a lot of money” because individuals with
untreated mental illness frequently develop physical illnesses (including heart
disease and liver failure) when their underlying mental illnesses are not addressed.226
Mr. Samuels concluded by stating that, “[a]ddressing these unmet [mental health]
needs ‘will save lives and huge amounts of money.’”227 Other than presenting these
three brief pieces of testimony, the Workshop Report did not specifically focus on
mental health and substance use disorder benefits.
The Consensus Report also focused little on mental health and substance use
disorder benefits other than recognizing that not all health plans cover substance
abuse detoxification services,228 that mental health and substance abuse coverage in
individual health plans has varied more than in small group health plans, with
coverage criteria being more influenced by state mandates,229 that mental health and
substance use disorder services appear less likely to be covered in standard
commercial subscriber contracts,230 and that, in terms of defining the EHB Package,
areas of particular complexity include mental health services.231
This Part IV seeks to remedy the informational and research limitations in
HHS’s initial steps towards implementing the EHB Package. Perhaps the primary
theme of the Workshop Report, the Consensus Report, and the EHB Bulletin with
respect to all ten of the ACA-required benefit categories was the perceived tension
between developing a comprehensive EHB Package and keeping healthcare costs
down.232 The Workshop Report presented many pieces of testimony that addressed
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the “clear tension between the desire to make the EHB [P]ackage as comprehensive
as possible and the need to make the EHB [P]ackage affordable . . . .”233 Dr. Louis
Jacques, Director of the Coverage & Analysis Group at the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services, specifically addressed the “competing needs of generosity and
affordability.”234 The Consensus Report also focused on comprehensiveness of
benefits versus cost: “If the package of benefits is too narrow, health insurance
might be meaningless; if it is too broad, insurance might become too expensive.”235
The EHB Bulletin also stated as one of HHS’s mains goals “balancing
comprehensiveness and affordability.”236
Part IV argues that the intense focus on the perceived relationship between the
comprehensiveness of benefits and healthcare costs in the Workshop Report,
Consensus Report, and EHB Bulletin might be misplaced in the context of mental
health and substance use disorder benefits. More specifically, this Part IV urges
HHS to consider the current empirical literature suggesting that, holding other nonmental health and substance use disorder benefits equal, the availability and use of
medically necessary mental health and substance use disorder benefits by individuals
with mental illnesses may actually lower the total (that is, the combined physical and
mental) healthcare costs for those individuals, thus making the provision of
comprehensive inpatient, outpatient, and other mental health and substance use
disorder benefits by health plans an economically efficient long-term decision.237
Stated another way, this Part IV urges HHS to consider the possibility of long-term
total healthcare cost returns on initial mental health treatment investments as HHS
implements the Mental Health Benefit Sub-Provision.
A. TRADITIONAL CONCERNS REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MENTAL
HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER BENEFITS AND HEALTHCARE COSTS238
The belief that mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefits and
mental health parity will cause healthcare costs to rise is not new.239 As background,

233

WORKSHOP R EPORT, supra note 10, at 3.
Id.
C ONSENSUS R EPORT, supra note 17, at xi.
236
EHB B ULLETIN , supra note 23, at 8.
237
See infra Part IV.B.
238
Parts IV.A-B of this Article are reprinted with updates and minor changes with permission
from Tovino, supra note 2, at pt. III.B. Part IV.C of this Article is new.
239
See, e.g., Parity of Medicare Benefits for Persons with Mental and Substance Use Conditions:
Before the H. Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. 2 (2007)
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health insurers historically have focused on the problems of moral hazard and
adverse selection when justifying mental health benefit disparities.240 In the context
of mental healthcare, moral hazard refers to the concern that individuals who do not
pay for 100% of the cost of their own mental healthcare will use more mental health
services because they do not value these services at their full cost.241 To control
moral hazard in the context of mental healthcare, insurers traditionally have imposed
lower inpatient day and outpatient visit maximums, as well as higher deductibles,
co-payments, and co-insurance amounts, on mental healthcare.242 Notwithstanding
insurers’ concerns regarding moral hazard in the context of mental healthcare, many
of which may be linked to the three-decades-old RAND Health Insurance
Experiment,243 recent studies demonstrate that the demand for mental health services
is less price elastic than the demand for physical health services and that the current
demand for mental health services is less price elastic than the demand for mental
health services was twenty-five to thirty years ago.244 Recent studies also suggest

parity . . . cite studies and reports that demonstrate that mental health parity will result in a significant
increase in the cost of employee insurance coverage.”); Nelson, supra note 68, at 106.
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that deductibles (in both the traditional indemnity245 and managed care246 settings)
and co-insurance amounts (in the managed care setting) have no impact and very
little impact, respectively, on the demand for mental healthcare.247 Additional studies
that analyze the impact of managed healthcare and behavioral health carve-out
plans248 on demand for mental healthcare suggest that the implementation of
managed behavioral healthcare undermines the assumed demand response as an
efficiency argument against parity.249 As a result, economists now suggest that the
imposition of higher deductibles, co-payments, and co-insurance amounts on mental
healthcare may no longer be justified on efficiency grounds and that the traditional
practice of unequal health insurance benefit sets may need to be revisited.250
Traditionally, insurers also have been concerned with adverse selection; that is,
the concern that in a healthcare market with voluntary insurance or multiple insurers,
plans that offer generous mental health benefits will attract individuals with greater
mental healthcare needs, leading to higher service usage and costs for those
insurers.251 Historically, many insurers have not offered mental health benefits as a
way of controlling adverse selection.252 Of course, the two pre-conditions to adverse
selection (voluntary insurance and multiple insurers) have been at the heart of the
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271 (1989) (referencing several definitions of managed care; offering one definition of “genuine
managed care[;]” that is, the attempt to improve, where possible, the system of care; and
characterizing other definitions of managed care by their attempts to lower the cost of medical care
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U.S. healthcare reform debate.253 Although Congress elected not to proceed with a
single-payer system, ACA requires most individuals to maintain minimum essential
health insurance coverage254 and requires exchange-offered qualified health plans,
non-exchange-offered individual health plans, non-exchange-offered small health
plans, Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plans, and state basic
healthcare plans to include the EHB Package in certain health plan settings,
including mental health and substance use disorder benefits.255 If upheld,256 these
two sets of ACA provisions will lessen insurers’ risks relating to adverse selection
beginning on the provisions’ compliance date of January 1, 2014.257
B. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ADDRESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MENTAL
HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER BENEFITS AND HEALTHCARE COSTS
Perceived moral hazard and adverse selection concerns may continue to exist
following January 1, 2014, however, because ACA does not currently require certain
categories of health plans (including grandfathered health plans, large group health
plans, and self-insured group health plans) to provide the EHB Package, including
mental health and substance use disorder benefits.258 This Article is based on
concern that such exempted health insurers—as well as those health plans that have
significant leeway in designing their benefit packages and substituting essential
services within and across ACA-required benefit categories—will continue to
impose mental health benefit limitations and will provide minimal mental health and
substance use disorder benefits, respectively, without recognizing the negative
clinical and related cost implications of their benefit limitations and without taking
into account the role of managed care in minimizing moral hazard and other
efficiency concerns.259 To address these concerns, the current empirical literature
regarding the relationship between mental health and substance use disorder benefits
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and healthcare costs is presented below. As discussed in more detail below, a
number of studies suggest that mental health benefit limitations may be associated
with a lack of access to mental healthcare and untreated mental illness.260 Studies
also suggest that untreated mental illness may increase total healthcare costs over
and above the cost of treating the mental illness, perhaps because individuals who
have a mental illness are more likely to have a physical illness261 and because
untreated mental illness can worsen the prognosis of, prolong the period of recovery
from, and increase the risk of mortality associated with physical illness.262 Finally, a
number of studies suggest that treating mental illness may either decrease or not
statistically significantly increase total healthcare costs, even taking into account the
costs of the provided mental health treatment.263
In the early 1990s, researchers affiliated with the Group Health Cooperative of
Puget Sound (“GHC”) desired to better understand the burden of depression on
individual patients and society as a whole.264 As background, the researchers
believed that diagnosis and treatment of depression in individuals could yield a
societal return on investment by lowering rates of unemployment and disability, but
the researchers were also aware of the need to understand and control healthcare
costs as part of any policy recommendation or initiative.265 The researchers thus set
out to investigate the relationship between untreated depression and total healthcare
costs in 6257 GHC health maintenance organization (HMO) members who were
eighteen years of age or older and were diagnosed with depression made during an
outpatient visit between April 1, 1992, and December 31, 1992.266 Using
computerized visit-diagnosis data, pharmacy records, and cost-accounting data from
GHC, the researchers compared overall healthcare costs for primary care patients
with recognized depression and overall healthcare costs for age- and gender-matched
patients without depression.267 The researchers found that the patients diagnosed
with depression had higher annual healthcare costs ($4246 versus $2371), and fifty
to seventy-five percent higher costs for every category of care, including the primary
care setting, all medical specialties, the medical inpatient setting, and the pharmacy
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and laboratory settings.268 The researchers concluded not only that the diagnosis of
depression was associated with a twofold increase in use of health services269 but
also that the greater medical utilization exceeded the costs that would be associated
with treating the depression.270 As part of their conclusion, the researchers
recommended that policy decisions regarding the scope of mental health benefits
take into account the association between depression and total healthcare costs.271
In 1997, researchers affiliated with GHC published the results of a second study
designed “to examine whether depressive symptoms in older adults contribute to the
increased cost of general medical services.”272 The researchers conducted a four-year
(1989-1993) prospective study of 2558 older-than-sixty-five adults in GHC.273
Through a mail survey and telephone interviews, the researchers measured each
participant’s depressive symptoms at baseline (1989), at two years (1991), and at
four years (1993).274 The researchers then compared each patient’s depressive
symptoms to data obtained from GHC’s cost accounting system relating to each
patient’s total healthcare costs.275 The researchers found that in the cohort of older
adults studied, depressive symptoms were common, persistent, and associated with a
significant increase in the cost of general medical services.276 More specifically, the
researchers found that patients with significant depression at baseline had higher
median costs ($2147) during the first year after baseline than patients without
depression ($1461).277 Patients with significant depressive symptoms at baseline also
had higher median costs at year four ($15,423) than patients without depressive
symptoms ($10,152).278 The researchers also found that the increase in the cost of
general medical services associated with depression was spread over all components
of healthcare.279 During the year following baseline, for example, patients with
depression had a higher number of inpatient admissions, outpatient visits, laboratory
tests, emergency department visits, prescriptions, ancillary visits, and optometry
visits.280 The researchers further found that the increase in the cost of general
medical services was not accounted for by an increase in specialty mental
healthcare,281 and that even after adjusting for differences in age, sex, and severity of
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chronic medical illness, the increase in healthcare costs remained significant.282 The
researchers formally concluded that depressive symptoms in older adults are
associated with a significant increase—roughly fifty percent—in the total cost of
general medical services.283 The researchers also suggested that mental health
insurance benefit disparities might be short-sighted because they ultimately may
increase total healthcare costs.284
Similar findings have been shown in other healthcare delivery settings. In 2009,
researchers affiliated with Massachusetts General Hospital and Massachusetts
Institution of Technology published the results of a study designed to better
understand the interaction between depression and the cost of non-mental healthcare
in eleven chronic co-morbid diseases.285 To that end, the researchers examined the
insurance claims of 618,780 patients enrolled in self-insured, private healthcare
plans based primarily in Texas, California, and across the eastern seaboard.286 The
researchers examined the insurance records, dating from September 1, 2004, to
August 31, 2005, for total annual non-mental health costs in eleven different disease
categories, including asthma, back pain, congestive heart failure, coronary artery
disease, diabetes, epilepsy, headache, hypertension, intervertebral disc disease,
obesity, and joint pain.287 In each disease cohort, the researchers calculated median
annual non-mental health cost for individuals with and without depression.288 The
researchers found that patients with depression had higher median per-patient annual
non-mental health costs than patients without depression in all eleven diseases
studied.289 The per-patient difference in non-mental health costs between nondepressed and depressed patients ranged from $1570 in obesity to $15,240 in
congestive heart failure.290 The ratio of cost between non-depressed and depressed
patients ranged from 1.5 in obesity to 2.9 in epilepsy.291 The researchers also found
that the median annual pharmaceutical costs for the depressed patients were
consistently higher than the pharmaceutical costs for the non-depressed patients,
with a difference ranging from $590 in obesity to $1410 in epilepsy.292 Finally, the
researchers found that “each of the 11 chronic co-morbid diseases was more
prevalent in the depressed cohort than in the non-depressed cohort” (with the ratio of
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prevalence between non-depressed and depressed patients ranging from 1.4 in
coronary artery disease and hypertension to 6.8 in obesity).293
Given this data, the Massachusetts-based researchers formally concluded that,
even when controlling for the number of chronic co-morbid diseases, depressed
patients had significantly higher costs than non-depressed patients in a magnitude
consistent across the eleven chronic co-morbid diseases.294 The researchers
suggested several potential reasons for their findings, including the possibility that
depressed patients engage in self-neglect, including non-compliance with
recommended healthcare.295 By way of explanation, the researchers noted that other
studies have shown that self-neglect in diabetes and heart disease patients is
correlated with higher utilization of emergency room, outpatient, inpatient, and
specialty services.296 The researchers also identified as a possible cause the
association between depression and “higher rates of harmful lifestyle factors such as
smoking, overeating, and lack of physical activity,” as well as more severe
pathophysiology across all chronic disease categories.297 Finally, the researchers
raised the question, but were unable to answer, whether there may be metabolic
factors associated with depression that exacerbate the pathophysiology of co-morbid
diseases.298
Similar depression-to-cost findings also have been demonstrated in the public
healthcare program setting. In 2009, researchers at the University of Washington,
Columbia University, the National Institute of Mental Health, and Green Ribbon
Health published their analysis of the healthcare claims of 14,902 Medicare
beneficiaries who were enrolled in a pilot disease management program designed to
investigate the association between depression and total healthcare costs as well as
specific components of healthcare costs.299 The majority of the Medicare
beneficiaries studied had diabetes, many had congestive heart failure, and
approximately twenty percent had both diabetes and congestive heart failure.300 The
researchers divided the beneficiaries into three mental health status groups: 2108
beneficiaries who had been diagnosed with depression, 1081 beneficiaries who had
not been officially diagnosed with depression but who screened positive when given
a questionnaire or who reported taking antidepressant medication, and 11,713
beneficiaries who did not have depression.301 The researchers found that the
beneficiaries diagnosed with depression incurred approximately $22,960 in total
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healthcare costs over one year, while those without depression incurred costs of
approximately $11,956 over the same year.302 Medicare beneficiaries with possible
depression based on depression screening or reported antidepressant use incurred
$14,365 in total annual healthcare costs.303
The researchers found that the beneficiaries with diagnosed depression spent
significantly more in almost all healthcare cost categories, including home
healthcare, skilled nursing care, outpatient non-mental healthcare, inpatient nonmental healthcare, physician services, and durable medical equipment.304 The
beneficiaries with diagnosed depression did not, however, spend more money on
specialty mental healthcare compared to the beneficiaries without depression.305
Total mental healthcare costs accounted for less than two percent of total healthcare
costs for the beneficiaries with depression.306 The researchers formally concluded
that among the Medicare beneficiaries with chronic medical illness whose data was
used in the study, those who also had depression both had significantly higher
healthcare costs and were not receiving enough mental healthcare.307 The researchers
theorized that the higher Medicare co-payments that applied to outpatient mental
healthcare (fifty percent at the time of the study, now forty percent) compared to
outpatient physical healthcare (twenty percent then and now) posed an obstacle to
the receipt of needed mental healthcare.308 The researchers suggested in their
conclusion that evidence-based depression care may yield long-term cost savings.309
Given the literature showing an association between untreated mental illness
and healthcare cost increases, a number of research groups began to investigate
whether treatment of mental illness could produce subsequent decreases in total
healthcare costs. To that end, researchers affiliated with GHC published in 2006 the
results of a study investigating the association between depression treatment and
healthcare costs over the subsequent six months.310 In their research, the study
authors analyzed data obtained from GHC associated with 1814 patients who met the
criteria for major depressive episode and entered treatment.311 Thirty-four percent of
the patients whose data were analyzed achieved remission from depression, thirtyseven percent improved but did not meet criteria for remission, and twenty-nine
percent had persistent major depression three to four months later.312 After adjusting
for baseline differences in the severity of each patient’s initial depression and
expected healthcare costs, the study authors found that mean health services costs
over the six months following acute-phase treatment were $2012 for those achieving
remission, $2571 for those improved but not remitted, and $3094 for those with
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persistent major depression.313 The study authors also found that average costs for
depression treatment, including antidepressant prescriptions, outpatient visits, and
mental health inpatient care, ranged from $429 in the full remission group to $585 in
the persistent depression group.314 The authors formally concluded that remission
from depression is associated with significantly lower subsequent healthcare
services utilization and healthcare costs across the full range of mental health and
general medical services compared with persistent depression.315
Similar findings have been demonstrated in a variety of other healthcare
delivery contexts. In 2008, for example, researchers published the results of a
randomized controlled trial, Improving Mood: Promoting Access to Collaborative
Treatment (IMPACT), which was designed to investigate the long-term effects on
total healthcare costs of participation in a depression treatment program compared
with usual primary care.316 Five hundred and fifty-one participants from two
IMPACT trial sites who satisfied clinical criteria for either depression or dysthymia
were randomly assigned to the IMPACT intervention group or to a usual primary
care group.317 The patients assigned to the IMPACT group had access for one year to
a depression care manager who provided education, behavioral activation, support of
antidepressant medication management prescribed by their regularly primary care
provider, and problem-solving treatment in primary care for up to twelve months.318
The patients assigned to the usual primary care group were told that they met the
criteria for major depression or dysthymia and were encouraged to follow up with
their primary care provider for treatment.319 The researchers obtained from the trial
sites cost accounting data that tracked costs associated with all healthcare delivered
to the patients.320
The study authors found that the patients who were assigned to the IMPACT
group had lower mean total healthcare costs ($29,422) over the four-year period
compared to the patients who were assigned to the usual-care group ($32,785),
which represented a cost savings among the IMPACT patients of $3363 per patient
on average during four years.321 The IMPACT patients had lower healthcare costs
than the usual-care patients in every healthcare cost category observed, including
outpatient mental health costs, inpatient mental health costs, outpatient medical
costs, inpatient medical and surgical costs, pharmacy costs, and other outpatient
costs.322 The researchers formally concluded that, when compared with usual
primary care, the IMPACT program is associated with a high probability of lower
total healthcare costs during a four-year period.323 The researchers also stated that
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their findings support the implementation of programs and policies that facilitate
coverage of—and reimbursement for—treatment of mental illnesses such as
depression and dysthymia.324
The studies described above were conducted in populations of patients with
traditional mental illnesses, such as depression and dysthymia.325 Researchers also
have investigated the relationship between treatment of other mental illnesses, such
as alcohol and drug abuse, and healthcare costs as well as a number of other
variables, including employment, drug and alcohol consumption, and criminal
activity.326 These studies show that treating alcohol and drug abuse can yield
significant clinical and economic returns on an employer’s or public healthcare
program’s initial treatment investment. For example, a group of researchers
published in 2000 the results of a study conducted in the State of Washington that
examined the clinical and economic returns on addiction treatment provided to 263
Medicaid-eligible drug addiction treatment clients.327 The clinical and economic
returns were calculated based on an analysis of several variables (each of which was
assigned a cost), including number of days experiencing medical problems,
overnight hospitalizations for medical treatments, emergency room visits for medical
treatment, clinic or physician visits for medical treatments, days experiencing
psychological or emotional problems, days in inpatient psychiatric treatment, days in
hospital outpatient psychiatric treatment, income received from employment, money
spent on alcohol, money spent on drugs, and days engaged in illegal activities.328
The study demonstrated that each dollar invested in full-continuum (FC) addiction
care (defined as care that begins with an inpatient hospital or residential stay, is
followed by intensive outpatient services, and is followed by outpatient aftercare)
and partial-continuum (PC) addiction care (defined as care that begins with intensive
outpatient care and is followed by additional less intensive outpatient care) yielded
returns of approximately 9.7 and 23.3 times their initial investments, respectively.329
The study also demonstrated that the average cost of treatment amounted to $2530
for FC addiction care and $1138 for PC addiction care, and that the average
economic benefit amounted to $20,363 for FC addiction care and $12,130 for PC
addiction care, producing a net economic benefit of both FC and PC addiction
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care.330 The study authors formally concluded that their results strongly suggest that
both FC and PC addiction care can generate positive and significant net benefits to
society.331
In addition to clinically oriented studies that use private health plan and public
healthcare program data to show an association between mental illness and total
healthcare costs, a second line of research based primarily in economics suggests
that the moral hazard concerns associated with mental health parity implementation
may have been valid decades ago in the traditional indemnity setting,332 the same
efficiency concerns are less valid under managed healthcare.333 This is especially
true for managed mental healthcare provided through a behavioral health carve-out
plan, which is a specialized managed behavioral health plan that is separate (or
carved out) from an employer’s or group’s regular managed care organization and
that has expertise in establishing specialty mental health provider networks,
negotiating mental health provider payment rates, and managing utilization to affect
the cost and supply of mental health services.334 The number of behavioral health
carve-out plans has increased significantly, perhaps due to the carve-out plans’
documented role in reducing inpatient admissions, lengths of stays, and total
spending on inpatient care.335 In theory, managed behavioral health carve-out plans
eliminate unnecessary utilization at its source and on a case-by-case basis.336
In one study published in 1998, three researchers tracked access, utilization, and
costs of mental healthcare for a large, private, West Coast-based employer over nine
years (1988-1996) during which managed care was introduced and mental health
benefits were substantially expanded and carved out of the traditional medical plan
by a behavioral health carve-out plan (“U.S. Behavioral Health”).337 In one of the
first long-term reports of the cost trend under a managed behavioral health carve-out
plan, the study authors reported a forty-three percent lower cost (including the
administrative fee charged by U.S. Behavioral Health) per enrollee per month in
1995 than in 1990, the year before the carve-out decision.338 The study authors
attributed the cost savings in part to a decline in inpatient admissions and an
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increased use of outpatient care.339 According to the study authors, “[t]he main result
is that despite higher initial access to specialty care in the post period and
substantially increased benefits, costs for mental healthcare declined dramatically in
the first year and continued to decline slowly in the following five years.”340 The
study authors concluded that the implementation of mental health parity in a
managed behavioral health carve-out setting could yield long-run cost containment
and that mental health parity implementation would not “brea[k] the bank.”341
In a second study published in 1998, two Boston University economists
examined the costs associated with a behavioral health carve-out plan initiated in
July 1993 by the Group Insurance Commission (GIC) of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.342 The economists obtained data from GIC eligibility and health
claims files dated July 1991 through June 1995, a period that included two years of
pre-carve-out data and two years of post-carve-out data.343 The economists found a
very significant cost reduction after the initiation of the carve-out plan.344 In the two
years prior to the initiation of the carve-out plan (1992 and 1993), plan costs were
$16.93 million and $14.82 million, respectively.345 In the two years following the
initiation of the carve-out plan (1994 and 1995), plan costs were $9.32 million and
$7.29 million, respectively.346 Average GIC payments per participant per month also
significantly decreased from $13.92 in 1992 and $12.22 in 1993 to $6.04 in 1994
and $4.77 in 1995.347 Overall, the economists found a fifty to sixty percent gross
reduction in costs and an estimated thirty to forty percent minimum net reduction in
costs after adjusting for a number of different trends, including a shifting enrollee
case-mix, rising medical prices, and a downward drift in mental health and substance
service use.348 The economists formally concluded that “by any standard, the data
show a very significant cost reduction after the carve-out.”349
In a third study published in 2008, three researchers from Harvard University
investigated the demand response of mental health services to cost-sharing under
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managed healthcare and compared it to the demand response of mental health
services to cost-sharing under traditional indemnity (fee-for-service) plans.350 More
specifically, the researchers obtained data from the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey and analyzed the effect of prices on the probability of ambulatory mental
health uses.351 The researchers found that the effect of the co-insurance rate on
ambulatory mental health services demand under managed care plans was
significantly smaller than that under indemnity plans and was not significantly
different than zero.352 The researchers formally concluded that managed care, not
out-of-pocket prices paid by consumers, controls rates of utilization.353 The
researchers also stated in their conclusion that efficiency arguments against mental
health parity may not apply to managed care settings.354
In addition to research demonstrating that the moral hazard concerns associated
with mental health parity may not apply in the managed care setting, a final line of
research examining the actual costs associated with the implementation of mental
health parity and mental health and substance use disorder benefits in particular
healthcare delivery settings shows that mental health parity implementation has not
increased total healthcare delivery costs. One such setting is the FEHBP, the largest
employer-sponsored health insurance program in the United States that serves more
than eight million federal employees, annuitants, and dependents.355 In January
2001, the FEHBP instituted a mental health and substance abuse parity policy in
compliance with a parity order issued by President Clinton in July 1999.356 The
parity order required equality between the rates, terms, and conditions (including
deductibles, co-payments, inpatient day limitations, and outpatient visit limitations)
that applied to the FEHBP’s medical and surgical benefits and those that applied to
mental health and substance use disorder benefits.357 At the time of its issuance, one
concern associated with the parity order was that the FEHBP would incur large
increases in both mental health service use and federal spending on mental health
services.358 HHS thus commissioned a study to evaluate the effect of the parity order
in the FEHBP on costs as well as other important indicators.359 The authors of the
commissioned study concluded that the cost concerns were unfounded: “When
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coupled with management of care, implementation of parity in insurance benefits for
behavioral health care can improve insurance protection without increasing total
costs.”360 The study authors explained that their findings reflected little or no effect
of mental health parity implementation on mental health services use and total
spending.361
The FEHBP is not alone in its mental health parity and mental health and
substance use disorder benefit implementation cost experiences. Reports indicate
that states with mental health parity legislation and mandatory mental health and
substance use disorder benefits have had similar experiences. By several reports,
California, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, and Vermont implemented mental health parity and/or
mental health and substance use disorder benefits and subsequently experienced
either lower costs or extremely modest cost increases (e.g., nineteen cents per
member per month in Vermont) in the first year of implementation.362 Additional
studies report that Maryland and North Carolina experienced decreased costs
following the implementation of mental health parity and mental health and
substance use disorder benefits when such parity coincided with the introduction of
managed behavioral healthcare.363
In summary, employers and insurers have offered a number of different reasons
for their disparate physical and mental health insurance benefits or lack of mental
health and substance use disorder benefits, including the argument that
comprehensive mental health benefits will cause costs to rise. However, as discussed
in this Part IV.B, the current health plan literature suggests that untreated mental
illness may be associated with increases in total healthcare costs and that treatment
of mental illness may be associated with decreases in total healthcare costs. In
addition, the current mental health economics literature suggests that managed
behavioral healthcare may significantly reduce—if not eliminate—the problem of
moral hazard in the context of mental healthcare.364 Finally, recent studies of cost
data obtained from healthcare delivery settings in which mental health parity and
mental health and substance use disorder benefits has been implemented suggest that
mental health benefits may have (at most) negligibly increased or (more typically)
decreased total healthcare delivery costs in those settings.365 The current empirical
literature thus may not support across-the-board concerns associated with the costs
of comprehensive mental health and substance use disorder benefits.
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The primary theme of the Workshop Report, the Consensus Report, and the EHB
Bulletin with respect to all ten of the ACA-required benefit categories was the
perceived tension between the comprehensiveness of benefits and healthcare cost
increases.366 Likely as a result of the intense focus on this perceived tension, the
HHS plan identified in the EHB Bulletin is timid with respect to the
comprehensiveness and specificity of the EHB Package.367 If HHS’s current plan is
adopted, states will have broad discretion in defining the EHB Package (including,
perhaps, a Package that contains modest mental health and substance use disorder
benefits), health plans will have flexibility in adjusting benchmarked benefits
(including adjustments that could further reduce mental health and substance use
disorder benefits), and health plans may be permitted to substitute services within
and across benefit categories (including substitutions away from mental health and
substance use disorder services and toward services in one or more of the other nine
ACA-required benefit categories).368
This Part IV has shown that the intense focus on the perceived relationship
between the comprehensiveness of benefits and healthcare cost increases in the
Workshop Report, Consensus Report, and EHB Bulletin might be misplaced in the
context of mental health and substance use disorder benefits. This Article thus
proposes that HHS consider adopting a comprehensive essential mental health and
substance use disorder benefit that includes, at a minimum, medically necessary and
evidence-based inpatient and outpatient mental healthcare services, inpatient
substance abuse detoxification services, inpatient and outpatient substance abuse
rehabilitation services, emergency mental healthcare services, prescription drugs for
mental health conditions, psychiatric disease management participation, and
community-based mental healthcare services. The current literature suggests that the
provision of these services to mentally ill individuals who need them may, in the
long run, decrease or not increase total healthcare expenditures.
One question that remains is how specific the EHB Package should be in terms
of the required mental health and substance use services. For example, should
regulations implementing the EHB Package specifically list the health conditions or
medical or other criteria for which particular mental health treatments, such as
individual psychotherapy, group counseling, particular name brand or generic
psychiatric drugs, electroconvulsive therapy, deep brain stimulation, or inpatient
detoxification and rehabilitation services, will be covered? As background, the
“specific v. flexible” debate in healthcare reform is a perennial issue. The Clinton
administration’s failed but incredibly specific Health Security Act of 1993 contained
a sixty-one-page enumerated list of covered benefits.369 Both the FEHBP and the
Massachusetts Health Care Reform Law, on the other hand, contain broadly defined
benefit categories.370 The value of specificity versus flexibility continues to be
debated, including in the statements made by speakers at the IOM workshops. On
behalf of the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, for example,
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Dr. Arnold Cohen stated that describing the EHB as specifically as possible “is the
surest way to protect our patients against potential conflict or debate regarding
medical necessity.”371 On the other hand, Ms. Katy Spangler, a Staff Member of the
Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, referred to the ten ACArequired benefit categories as “buckets of care” and explained that they were
“intentionally left vague so that details of what plans would cover could be left to
the marketplace.”372 Dr. Rex Cowdry of the Maryland Health Care Commission
cautioned the Committee against “too much design specificity or standardization,” as
this “prevents the kind of innovation needed to control health care costs.”373 Dr.
David Guzick, Senior Vice President for Health Affairs and President of the
University of Florida Shands Health System, urged the Committee to leave
condition-specific decisions to the marketplace in order “to reflect evolving clinical
knowledge, appropriate practices, and appropriate oversight at the state level by
insurance commissioners.”374 Other stakeholders also believed that a flexible EHB
Package would allow for innovation, including advances in technology and
treatments.375
On one hand, the literature discussed at Part IV.B suggests clinical and cost
benefits of particular medically necessary mental health treatments and services,
such as the disease management services provided to the individuals who
participated in the IMPACT (2008) study376 and the FC and PC addiction care
services provided to the individuals who participated in the State of Washington
(2000) study.377 On the other hand, the evidence base for mental health and
substance abuse care is rapidly changing and the ability of HHS or a state to update
specific lists of services that are tied to specific health conditions, medical criteria,
or other criteria may be unrealistic. I thus propose that the initial EHB Package
include at least the following specific categories of mental health and substance
abuse disorder services: inpatient and outpatient mental healthcare services, inpatient
substance abuse detoxification services, inpatient and outpatient substance abuse
rehabilitation services, emergency mental healthcare services, prescription drugs for
mental health conditions, psychiatric disease management programs, and
community-based mental healthcare services. I further propose that these specific
categories of mental health and substance use disorder benefits, and any specific
treatments or services provided under each category, be reviewed regularly to ensure
a basis in the current medical and scientific literatures. I finally propose that the
mental healthcare treatment and cost literature be reviewed on a regular basis.
Should the findings of the mental healthcare treatment and cost literature change
such that an initial mental health treatment investment is no longer a long-term value
with respect to total healthcare costs (either due to changes in the way in which
mental healthcare is managed, changes in the relationship between the cost of
currently experimental but possibly future mental health treatments (such as deep
brain stimulation) compared to total healthcare costs, or changes in any other
variable), the proposals in this Article may need to be revisited.
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